Coupon distribution is a critical marketing strategy used by online platforms to boost revenue and enhance user engagement. Regrettably, existing coupon distribution strategies fall far short of effectively leveraging the complex sequential interactions between platforms and users. This critical oversight, despite the abundance of e-commerce log data, has precipitated a performance plateau. In this paper, we focus on the scene that the platforms make sequential coupon distribution decision multiple times for various users, with each user interacting with the platform repeatedly. Based on this marketing scenario, we propose a novel marketing framework, named Sequence-Aware Constrained Optimization (SACO) framework, to directly devise coupon distribution policy for long-term revenue boosting. SACO framework enables optimized online decision-making in a variety of real-world marketing scenarios. It achieves this by seamlessly integrating three key characteristics, general scenarios, sequential modeling with more comprehensive historical data, and efficient iterative updates within a unified framework. Furthermore, empirical results on real-world industrial dataset, alongside public and synthetic datasets demonstrate the superiority of our framework.

Auto-bidding plays an essential role in online advertising, allowing agents to automatically adjust bids for advertisers. Recently, the rise of Marketing Management service in e-commerce platforms has driven the evolution from auto-bidding to auto-marketing, enabling merchants to delegate their advertising bidding and product's coupon discounting decisions to agents. Auto-marketing requires agents to jointly decide on bidding and coupon discounting. Furthermore, compared to classic static constraints, auto-marketing agent faces a self-funding constraint (where the budget for both bidding and coupon discounting is entirely derived from the agent's commission revenue). Existing rule-based or RL-based methods often struggle with dynamic environments and complex sequential dependencies. To overcome these limitations, we propose a Generative Auto-Marketing framework (GAM), designed for performing joint sequential decisions on bidding and coupon discounting, and optimizing business objectives through post-training alignment. Furthermore, GAM employs a flexible, constraint-aware reward alignment module, and utilizes Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to align the pre-trained model, thus empirically balancing objective maximization and constraint satisfaction. We construct an offline simulation environment based on large-scale real-world dataset, and demonstrate the effectiveness of GAM through extensive experimental results.

The canonical model for multi-channel marketing, Bandits with Knapsacks (BwK), optimizes cumulative rewards subject to resource constraints but typically assumes a fixed, exogenous budget. This assumption is tenuous in real-world systems requiring performance-adaptive investment, where pre-committing to a budget is challenging and suboptimal. We introduce Marketing Hosting, a paradigm modeling the budget as an endogenous, performance-dependent variable. This yields a new problem class, Bandits with Endogenous Knapsacks (BwEK), characterized by a challenging feedback loop coupling rewards with constraints. We develop a specialized primal-dual algorithm to manage this coupling. For settings with hard, per-round constraints, we design a novel risk-aware algorithm that mitigates the path-dependent risk of ruin, providing the first high-probability safety guarantee for such problems. Finally, we solve the strategic bi-level problem of learning the optimal reinvestment rate. We validate our theoretical results through extensive simulations, real-world data experiments, and a live A/B test.

Previous ad auctions predominantly relied on rule-based mechanisms, which selected winning advertisements (ads) at the ad-level and subsequently combined them into page views (PVs), leading to suboptimal allocations in multi-round auctions. This limitation stems from the significant computational burden required to design ranking score rules and select winning ad sets, as well as the inability to fully capture contextual information within PVs during ad-level selection. In this paper, we propose a key-performance-indicator (KPI) based auction mechanism that selects winning PVs at the PV-level, modeling the ad allocation as a constrained optimization problem. This approach enables us to address both short-term and long-term KPIs while leveraging the comprehensive contextual information available within PVs. Based on this framework, we design GenAuction, a generative auction mechanism utilizing a Generator-Evaluator architecture powered by Transformer algorithms. The Generator swiftly generates multiple candidate PVs, while the Evaluator selects the optimal PVs based on contextual information, adhering to the objectives and KPIs of multi-round auctions. We conduct extensive experiments using real-world data and online A/B tests to validate that GenAuction efficiently handles multi-objective allocation tasks, demonstrating its efficacy and potential for real-world application.

Online advertising is a primary source of income for e-commerce platforms. In the current advertising pattern, the oriented targets are the online store owners who are willing to pay extra fees to enhance the position of their stores. On the other hand, brand suppliers are also desirable to advertise their products in stores to boost brand sales. However, the currently used advertising mode cannot satisfy the demand of both stores and brand suppliers simultaneously. To address this, we innovatively propose a joint advertising model termed ''Joint Auction'', allowing brand suppliers and stores to collaboratively bid for advertising slots, catering to both their needs. However, conventional advertising auction mechanisms are not suitable for this novel scenario. In this paper, we propose JRegNet, a neural network architecture for the optimal joint auction design, to generate mechanisms that can achieve the optimal revenue and guarantee (near-)dominant strategy incentive compatibility and individual rationality. Finally, multiple experiments are conducted on synthetic and real data to demonstrate that our proposed joint auction significantly improves platform's revenue compared to the known baselines.