Yunang Chen

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4ranked-venue papers
4as first author
4since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

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Security and privacy · 4 · 4 first-author · 4 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Scalable Metadata-Hiding for Privacy-Preserving IoT Systems
abstract
Modern cloud-based IoT services comprise an integrator service and several device vendor services. The vendor services enable users to remotely control their devices, while the integrator serves as a central intermediary, offering a unified interface for managing devices from different vendors. Although such a model is quite beneficial for IoT services to evolve quickly, it also creates a serious privacy concern: the vendor and integrator services observe all interactions between users and devices. Toward this, we propose Mohito, a privacy-preserving IoT system that hides such interactions from both the integrator and the vendors. In Mohito, we protect both the interaction data and the metadata, so that no one learns which user is communicating with which device. By utilizing oblivious key-value storage as a primitive and leveraging the unique communication graph of IoT services, we build a scalable protocol specialized in handling large concurrent traffic, a common demand in IoT systems. Our evaluation shows that Mohito can achieve up to 600x more throughput than the state-of-the-art general-purpose systems that provide similar security guarantees.
Yunang Chen, David Heath 0001, Rahul Chatterjee 0001, Earlence Fernandes
Proc. Priv. Enhancing Technol.1
2022 Experimental Security Analysis of the App Model in Business Collaboration Platforms
Yunang Chen, Yue Gao 0011, Nick Ceccio, Rahul Chatterjee 0001, Kassem Fawaz, Earlence Fernandes
USENIX Security Symposium1
2022 Practical Data Access Minimization in Trigger-Action Platforms
Yunang Chen, Mohannad Alhanahnah, Andrei Sabelfeld, Rahul Chatterjee 0001, Earlence Fernandes
USENIX Security Symposium1
2021 Data Privacy in Trigger-Action Systems
abstract
Trigger-action platforms (TAPs) allow users to connect independent web-based or IoT services to achieve useful automation. They provide a simple interface that helps end-users create trigger-compute-action rules that pass data between disparate Internet services. Unfortunately, TAPs introduce a large-scale security risk: if they are compromised, attackers will gain access to sensitive data for millions of users. To avoid this risk, we propose eTAP, a privacy-enhancing trigger-action platform that executes trigger-compute-action rules without accessing users’ private data in plaintext or learning anything about the results of the computation. We use garbled circuits as a primitive, and leverage the unique structure of trigger-compute-action rules to make them practical. We formally state and prove the security guarantees of our protocols. We prototyped eTAP, which supports the most commonly used operations on popular commercial TAPs like IFTTT and Zapier. Specifically, it supports Boolean, arithmetic, and string operations on private trigger data and can run 100% of the top-500 rules of IFTTT users and 93.4% of all publicly-available rules on Zapier. Based on ten existing rules that exercise a wide variety of operations, we show that eTAP has a modest performance impact: on average rule execution latency increases by 70 ms (55%) and throughput reduces by 59%.
Yunang Chen, Amrita Roy Chowdhury 0001, Ruizhe Wang 0003, Andrei Sabelfeld, Rahul Chatterjee 0001, Earlence Fernandes
SP1