Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Marek Bojko
dblp:282/0538
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0004-3726-0153ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
information elicitation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
mechanism design |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information · EC 2025 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
social welfare |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and Information · EC 2025 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
message-driven mechanism · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences and InformationabstractWe study mechanism design when agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. We show that standard message-driven mechanisms cannot implement socially efficient allocations when agents have multidimensional types, even under favorable conditions. Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Dütting, Renato Paes Leme, Song Zuo |
EC | 2 |