In Imitation Learning (IL), utilizing suboptimal and heterogeneous demonstrations presents a substantial challenge due to the varied nature of real-world data. However, standard IL algorithms consider these datasets as homogeneous, thereby inheriting the deficiencies of suboptimal demonstrators. Previous approaches to this issue rely on impractical assumptions like high-quality data subsets, confidence rankings, or explicit environmental knowledge. This paper introduces IRLEED, *Inverse Reinforcement Learning by Estimating Expertise of Demonstrators*, a novel framework that overcomes these hurdles without prior knowledge of demonstrator expertise. IRLEED enhances existing Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) algorithms by combining a general model for demonstrator suboptimality to address reward bias and action variance, with a Maximum Entropy IRL framework to efficiently derive the optimal policy from diverse, suboptimal demonstrations. Experiments in both online and offline IL settings, with simulated and human-generated data, demonstrate IRLEED's adaptability and effectiveness, making it a versatile solution for learning from suboptimal demonstrations.

Many existing imitation learning datasets are collected from multiple demonstrators, each with different expertise at different parts of the environment. Yet, standard imitation learning algorithms typically treat all demonstrators as homogeneous, regardless of their expertise, absorbing the weaknesses of any suboptimal demonstrators. In this work, we show that unsupervised learning over demonstrator expertise can lead to a consistent boost in the performance of imitation learning algorithms. We develop and optimize a joint model over a learned policy and expertise levels of the demonstrators. This enables our model to learn from the optimal behavior and filter out the suboptimal behavior of each demonstrator. Our model learns a single policy that can outperform even the best demonstrator, and can be used to estimate the expertise of any demonstrator at any state. We illustrate our findings on real-robotic continuous control tasks from Robomimic and discrete environments such as MiniGrid and chess, out-performing competing methods in 21 out of 23 settings, with an average of 7% and up to 60% improvement in terms of the final reward.

In the past two decades we have seen the popularity of neural networks increase in conjunction with their classification accuracy. Parallel to this, we have also witnessed how fragile the very same prediction models are: tiny perturbations to the inputs can cause misclassification errors throughout entire datasets. In this paper, we consider perturbations bounded by the ℓ0–norm, which have been shown as effective attacks in the domains of image-recognition, natural language processing, and malware-detection. To this end, we propose a novel defense method that consists of "truncation" and "adversarial training". We then theoretically study the Gaussian mixture setting and prove the asymptotic optimality of our proposed classifier. Motivated by the insights we obtain, we extend these components to neural network classifiers. We conduct numerical experiments in the domain of computer vision using the MNIST and CIFAR datasets, demonstrating significant improvement for the robust classification error of neural networks.

Coordination is often critical to forming prosocial behaviors -- behaviors that increase the overall sum of rewards received by all agents in a multi-agent game. However, state of the art reinforcement learning algorithms often suffer from converging to socially less desirable equilibria when multiple equilibria exist. Previous works address this challenge with explicit reward shaping, which requires the strong assumption that agents can be forced to be prosocial. We propose using a less restrictive peer-rewarding mechanism, gifting, that guides the agents toward more socially desirable equilibria while allowing agents to remain selfish and decentralized. Gifting allows each agent to give some of their reward to other agents. We employ a theoretical framework that captures the benefit of gifting in converging to the prosocial equilibrium by characterizing the equilibria's basins of attraction in a dynamical system. With gifting, we demonstrate increased convergence of high risk, general-sum coordination games to the prosocial equilibrium both via numerical analysis and experiments.