Abstract We study concurrent graph games where n players cooperate against an opponent to reach a set of target states. Unlike traditional settings, we study distributed randomisation: team players do not share a source of randomness, and their private random sources are hidden from the opponent and from each other. We show that memoryless strategies are sufficient for the threshold problem (deciding whether there is a strategy for the team that ensures winning with probability that exceeds a threshold), a result that not only places the problem in the Existential Theory of the Reals ( $$\exists \mathbb {R}$$ ∃ R ) but also enables the construction of value iteration algorithms. We additionally show that the threshold problem is $$\textsf{NP}$$ NP -hard. For the almost-sure reachability problem, we prove $$\textsf{NP}$$ NP -completeness. We introduce Individually Randomised Alternating-time Temporal Logic (IRATL). This logic extends the standard ATL framework to reason about probability thresholds, with semantics explicitly designed for coalitions that lack a shared source of randomness. On the practical side, we implement and evaluate a solver for the threshold and almost-sure problem based on the algorithms that we develop.

Consider a 4-player version of Matching Pennies where a team of three players competes against the Devil. Each player simultaneously says "Heads" or "Tails". The team wins if all four choices match; otherwise the Devil wins. If all team players randomise independently, they win with probability 1/8; if all players share a common source of randomness, they win with probability 1/2. What happens when each pair of team players shares a source of randomness? Can the team do better than win with probability 1/4? The surprising (and nontrivial) answer is yes! We introduce Dicey Games, a formal framework motivated by the study of distributed systems with shared sources of randomness (of which the above example is a specific instance). We characterise the existence, representation and computational complexity of optimal strategies in Dicey Games, and we study the problem of allocating limited sources of randomness optimally within a team.

Fairness is a desirable and crucial property of many protocols that handle, for instance, exchanges of message. It states that if at least one agent engaging in the protocol is honest, then either the protocol will unfold correctly and fulfill its intended goal for all participants, or it will fail for everyone. In this work, we present a game-based framework for the study of fairness protocols, that does not define a priori an attacker model. It is based on the notion of strong secure equilibria, and leverages the conceptual and algorithmic toolbox of game theory. In the case of finite games, we provide decision procedures with tight complexity bounds for determining whether a protocol is immune to nefarious attacks from a coalition of participants, and whether such a protocol could exist based on the underlying graph structure and objectives.

A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an ε-Nash equilibrium if no player can gain more than ε by unilaterally deviating from their strategy. In this work, we use ε-Nash equilibria to approximate the computation of Nash equilibria. Specifically, we focus on turn-based, multiplayer stochastic games played on graphs, where players are restricted to stationary strategies - strategies that use randomness but not memory. The problem of deciding the constrained existence of stationary Nash equilibria - where each player’s payoff must lie within a given interval - is known to be ∃ℝ-complete in such a setting (Hansen and Sølvsten, 2020). We extend this line of work to stationary ε-Nash equilibria and present an algorithm that solves the following promise problem: given a game with a Nash equilibrium satisfying the constraints, compute an ε-Nash equilibrium that ε-satisfies those same constraints - satisfies the constraints up to an ε additive error. Our algorithm runs in FNP^NP time. To achieve this, we first show that if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then one exists where the non-zero probabilities are at least an inverse of a double-exponential in the input. We further prove that such a strategy can be encoded using floating-point representations, as in the work of Frederiksen and Miltersen (2013), which finally gives us our FNP^NP algorithm. We further show that the decision version of the promise problem is NP-hard. Finally, we show a partial tightness result by proving a lower bound for such techniques: if a constrained Nash equilibrium exists, then there must be one where the probabilities in the strategies are double-exponentially small.

We consider equilibria in multiplayer stochastic graph games with terminal-node rewards. In such games, Nash equilibria are defined assuming that each player seeks to maximise their expected payoff, ignoring their aversion or tolerance to risk. We therefore study risk-sensitive equilibria (RSEs), where the expected payoff is replaced by a risk measure. A classical risk measure in the literature is the entropic risk measure, where each player has a real valued parameter capturing their risk-averseness. We introduce the extreme risk measure, which corresponds to extreme cases of entropic risk measure, where players are either extreme optimists or extreme pessimists. Under extreme risk measure, every player is an extremist: an extreme optimist perceives their reward as the maximum payoff that can be achieved with positive probability, while an extreme pessimist expects the minimum payoff achievable with positive probability. We argue that the extreme risk measure, especially in multi-player graph based settings, is particularly relevant as they can model several real life instances such as interactions between secure systems and potential security threats, or distributed controls for safety critical systems. We prove that RSEs defined with the extreme risk measure are guaranteed to exist when all rewards are non-negative. Furthermore, we prove that the problem of deciding whether a given game contains an RSE that generates risk measures within specified intervals is decidable and NP-complete for our extreme risk measure, and even PTIME-complete when all players are extreme optimists, while that same problem is undecidable using the entropic risk measure or even the classical expected payoff. This establishes, to our knowledge, the first decidable fragment for equilibria in simple stochastic games without restrictions on strategy types or number of players.

We study a natural problem about rational behaviors in multiplayer non-zero-sum sequential infinite duration games played on graphs: rational verification, that consists in deciding whether all the rational answers to a given strategy satisfy some specification. We give the complexities of that problem for two major concepts of rationality: Nash equilibria and subgame-perfect equilibria, and for three major classes of payoff functions: energy, discounted-sum, and mean-payoff.

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with a fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we use that characterization to prove that the SPE threshold problem, who status was left open in the literature, is decidable.

We study the complexity of problems related to subgame-perfect equilibria (SPEs) in infinite duration non zero-sum multiplayer games played on finite graphs with parity objectives. We present new complexity results that close gaps in the literature. Our techniques are based on a recent characterization of SPEs in prefix-independent games that is grounded on the notions of requirements and negotiation, and according to which the plays supported by SPEs are exactly the plays consistent with the requirement that is the least fixed point of the negotiation function. The new results are as follows. First, checking that a given requirement is a fixed point of the negotiation function is an NP-complete problem. Second, we show that the SPE constrained existence problem is NP-complete, this problem was previously known to be ExpTime-easy and NP-hard. Third, the SPE constrained existence problem is fixed-parameter tractable when the number of players and of colors are parameters. Fourth, deciding whether some requirement is the least fixed point of the negotiation function is complete for the second level of the Boolean hierarchy. Finally, the SPE-verification problem - that is, the problem of deciding whether there exists a play supported by a SPE that satisfies some LTL formula - is PSpace-complete, this problem was known to be ExpTime-easy and PSpace-hard.

We establish that the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) threshold problem for mean-payoff games is NP-complete. While the SPE threshold problem was recently shown to be decidable (in doubly exponential time) and NP-hard, its exact worst case complexity was left open.

In this paper, we provide an effective characterization of all the subgame-perfect equilibria in infinite duration games played on finite graphs with mean-payoff objectives. To this end, we introduce the notion of requirement, and the notion of negotiation function. We establish that the plays that are supported by SPEs are exactly those that are consistent with the least fixed point of the negotiation function. Finally, we show that the negotiation function is piecewise linear, and can be analyzed using the linear algebraic tool box. As a corollary, we prove the decidability of the SPE constrained existence problem, whose status was left open in the literature.