Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over bundles -- an agent receives $\sum_{j=1}^t\frac{1}{j}$ utility if $t$ of her approved items are selected -- then welfare optimisation is captured by a voting rule known as Proportional Approval Voting (PAV). PAV also satisfies demanding fairness axioms. However, finding a winning set of items under PAV is NP-hard. In search of a tractable method with strong fairness guarantees, a bounded local search version of PAV was proposed by Aziz et al. It proceeds by starting with an arbitrary size-$k$ set $W$ and, at each step, checking if there is a pair of candidates $a\in W$, $b\not\in W$ such that swapping $a$ and $b$ increases the total welfare by at least $\varepsilon$; if yes, it performs the swap. Aziz et al.~show that setting $\varepsilon=\frac{n}{k^2}$ ensures both the desired fairness guarantees and polynomial running time. However, they leave it open whether the algorithm converges in polynomial time if $\varepsilon$ is very small (in particular, if we do not stop until there are no welfare-improving swaps). We resolve this open question, by showing that if $\varepsilon$ can be arbitrarily small, the running time of this algorithm may be super-polynomial. Specifically, we prove a lower bound of~$Ω(k^{\log k})$ if improvements are chosen lexicographically. To complement our lower bound, we provide an empirical comparison of two variants of local search -- better-response and best-response -- on several real-life data sets and a variety of synthetic data sets. Our experiments indicate that, empirically, better response exhibits faster running time than best response.

Partitioning a large group of employees into teams can prove difficult because unsatisfied employees may want to transfer to other teams. In this case, the team (coalition) formation is unstable and incentivizes deviation from the proposed structure. Such a coalition formation scenario can be modeled in the framework of hedonic games and a significant amount of research has been devoted to the study of stability in such games. Unfortunately, stable coalition structures are not guaranteed to exist in general and their practicality is further hindered by computational hardness barriers.

The Mallows model is a popular distribution for ranked data. We empirically and theoretically analyze how the properties of rankings sampled from the Mallows model change when increasing the number of alternatives. We find that real-world data behaves differently from the Mallows model, yet is in line with its recent variant proposed by Boehmer et al. [IJCAI ’21]. As part of our study, we issue several warnings about using the classic Mallows model. For instance, we find that one should be extremely careful when using the Mallows model to generate data for experiments with a varying number of alternatives, as observed trends in such experiments might be due to the changing nature of the generated data.

Van Zuylen et al. (2014) introduced the notion of a popular ranking in a voting context, where each voter submits a strict ranking of all candidates. A popular ranking π of the candidates is at least as good as any other ranking σ in the following sense: if we compare π to σ, at least half of all voters will always weakly prefer π. Whether a voter prefers one ranking to another is calculated based on the Kendall distance. A more traditional definition of popularity—as applied to popular matchings, a well-established topic in computational social choice—is stricter, because it requires at least half of the voters who are not indifferent between π and σ to prefer π. In this paper, we derive structural and algorithmic results in both settings, also improving upon the results in Van Zuylen et al. (2014). We also point out connections to the famous open problem of finding a Kemeny consensus with three voters.

We consider the setting where the members of a society (voters) have preferences over candidates, and the candidates can be ordered on an axis so that the voters’ preferences are single-peaked on this axis. We ask whether this axis can be identified by sampling the voters’ preferences. For several natural distributions, we obtain tight bounds on the number of samples required and show that, surprisingly, the bounds are independent of the number of candidates. We extend our results to the case where voters’ preferences are sampled from two different axes over the same candidate set (one of which may be known). We also consider two alternative models of learning: (1) sampling pairwise comparisons rather than entire votes, and (2) learning from equivalence queries.

In some preference aggregation scenarios, voters' preferences are highly structured: e.g., the set of candidates may have one-dimensional structure (so that voters' preferences are single-peaked) or be described by a binary decision tree (so that voters' preferences are group-separable). However, sometimes a single axis or a decision tree is insufficient to capture the voters' preferences; rather, there is a small number K of axes or decision trees such that each vote in the profile is consistent with one of these axes (resp., trees). In this work, we study the complexity of deciding whether voters' preferences can be explained in this manner. For K=2, we use the technique developed by Yang [2020, https://doi.org/10.3233/FAIA200099] in the context of single-peaked preferences to obtain a polynomial-time algorithm for several domains: value-restricted preferences, group-separable preferences, and a natural subdomain of group-separable preferences, namely, caterpillar group-separable preferences. For K > 2, the problem is known to be hard for single-peaked preferences; we establish that it is also hard for value-restricted and group-separable preferences. Our positive results for K=2 make use of forbidden minor characterizations of the respective domains; in particular, we establish that the domain of caterpillar group-separable preferences admits a forbidden minor characterization.

Graph homomorphism problems involve finding adjacency-preserving mappings between two given graphs. Although theoretically hard, these problems can often be solved in practice using constraint programming algorithms. We show how techniques from the state-of-the-art in subgraph isomorphism solving can be applied to broader graph homomorphism problems, and introduce a new form of filtering based upon clique-finding. We demonstrate empirically that this filtering is effective for the locally injective graph homomorphism and subgraph isomorphism problems, and gives the first practical constraint programming approach to finding general graph homomorphisms.