The existence of a polynomial pivot rule for the simplex method for linear programming, policy iteration for Markov decision processes, and strategy improvement for parity games each are prominent open problems in their respective fields. While numerous natural candidates for efficient rules have been eliminated, all existing lower bound constructions are tailored to individual or small sets of pivot rules. We introduce a unified framework for formalizing classes of rules according to the information about the input that they rely on. Within this framework, we show lower bounds for ranking-based classes of rules that base their decisions on orderings of the improving pivot steps induced by the underlying data. Our first result is a superpolynomial lower bound for strategy improvement, obtained via a family of sink parity games, which applies to memory-based generalizations of Bland's rule that only access the input by comparing the ranks of improving edges in some global order. Our second result is a subexponential lower bound for policy iteration, obtained via a family of Markov decision processes, which applies to memoryless rules that only access the input by comparing improving actions according to their ranks in a global order, their reduced costs, and the associated improvements in objective value. Both results carry over to the simplex method for linear programming.

Symmetric strategy improvement is an algorithm introduced by Schewe et al. (ICALP 2015) that can be used to solve two-player games on directed graphs such as parity games and mean payoff games. In contrast to the usual well-known strategy improvement algorithm, it iterates over strategies of both players simultaneously. The symmetric version solves the known worst-case examples for strategy improvement quickly, however its worst-case complexity remained open. We present a class of worst-case examples for symmetric strategy improvement on which this symmetric version also takes exponentially many steps. Remarkably, our examples exhibit this behaviour for any choice of improvement rule, which is in contrast to classical strategy improvement where hard instances are usually hand-crafted for a specific improvement rule. We present a generalized version of symmetric strategy iteration depending less rigidly on the interplay of the strategies of both players. However, it turns out it has the same shortcomings.