Writing device drivers is notoriously hard, and driver bugs are a major cause of system failures and vulnerabilities. The problem is particularly acute in bus-based protocols like I2C, where driver correctness is only half the story: correct functioning of the complete subsystem depends on all components on the bus interoperating correctly. Unfortunately, developers cannot control all aspects of a platform, and must interact with existing devices (peripherals and/or hardware bus controllers) which may misbehave. Failures in a protocol like I2C, often used in critical low-level system management, can result in permanent damage to the hardware, whether a server or a satellite.

The immense hardware complexity of modern computers, both mobile phones and datacenter servers, is a seemingly endless source of bugs and vulnerabilities in system software.

Hybrid computing platforms, comprising CPU cores and FPGA logic, are increasingly used for accelerating data-intensive workloads in cloud deployments, and are a growing topic of interest in systems research. However, from a research perspective, existing hardware platforms are limited: they are often optimized for concrete, narrow use-cases and, therefore lack the flexibility needed to explore other applications and configurations.

Modern Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) are networks of heterogeneous cores, intelligent devices, and memory, connected through multiple configurable address translation and protection units like IOMMUs and System MMUs.

Modern hardware platforms are increasingly complex and heterogeneous. System software uses a hodgepodge of different mechanisms and representations to express the memory topology of the target platform. Considerable maintenance effort is required to keep them in sync while often sharing is impossible due to hard-coded values. Incorrect platform-specific values in the hardware initialization sequence can lead to security critical and hard-to-find bugs because of misconfigured translation hardware, inaccessible devices, or the use of bad pointers.

Modern computer server systems are increasingly managed at a low level by baseboard management controllers (BMCs). BMCs are processors with access to the most critical parts of the platform, below the level of OS or hypervisor, including control over power delivery to every system component. Buggy or poorly designed BMC software not only poses a security threat to a machine, it can permanently render the hardware inoperative. Despite this, there is little published work on how to rigorously engineer the power management functionality of BMCs so as to prevent this happening. This article takes a first step toward putting BMC software on a sound footing by specifying the hardware environment and the constraints necessary for safe and correct operation. This is best accomplished through automation: correct-by-construction power control sequences can be efficiently generated from a simple, trustworthy model of the platform’s power tree that incorporates the sequencing requirements and safe voltage ranges of all components. We present both a modeling language for complex power-delivery networks and a tool to automatically generate safe, efficient power sequences for complex modern platforms. This not only increases the trustworthiness of a hitherto opaque yet critical element of platform firmware: regulator and chip power models are significantly simpler to produce than hand-written power sequences. This, combined with model reuse for common components, reduces both time and cost associated with platform bring-up for new hardware. We evaluate our tool using a new high-performance 2-socket server platform with >100W per socket TDP, tight voltage limits and 25 distinct power regulators needing configuration, showing both fast (<10s) tool runtime, and correct power sequencing of a live system.