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Stefan Popoveniuc

dblp:29/6104 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 2 first-author

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
ballot secrecy
0.112010
Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy · USENIX Security Symposium 2010
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
end-to-end verifiable e-voting
0.112010
Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy · USENIX Security Symposium 2010
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
end-to-end verifiable voting
0.112009
Scantegrity II: end-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting
verifiable voting
0.112009
Scantegrity II: end-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
voting
0.012010
Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy · USENIX Security Symposium 2010
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › electronic voting › verifiable voting
voter verification
0.012009
Scantegrity II: end-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2009

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

cryptographic verification · 0.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2011 On the Privacy Threats of Electronic Poll Books
Stefan Popoveniuc, John Kelsey, Eugen Leontie
SECRYPT1
2010 Safe RPC - Auditing Mixnets Safely using Randomized Partial Checking
Stefan Popoveniuc, Eugen Leontie
SECRYPT1
2010 Scantegrity II Municipal Election at Takoma Park: The First E2E Binding Governmental Election with Ballot Privacy
Richard Carback, David Chaum, Jeremy Clark, John Conway, Aleksander Essex, Paul S. Herrnson, Travis Mayberry, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, Poorvi L. Vora
USENIX Security Symposium8
2010 Corrections to scantegrity II: end-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes
abstract
In the above titled paper (ibid., vol. 4, no. 4, pp. 611-627, Dec. 09), due to a production error, the affiliations of two of the authors were listed incorrectly. The correct affiliations are presented here. Also, the name of the last author in the affiliations footnote was printed incorrectly. The correct name is P. Y. A. Ryan.
David Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, Poorvi L. Vora
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.5
2009 Scantegrity II: end-to-end verifiability by voters of optical scan elections through confirmation codes
abstract
Scantegrity II is an enhancement for existing paper ballot systems. It allows voters to verify election integrity - from their selections on the ballot all the way to the final tally - by noting codes and checking for them online. Voters mark Scantegrity II ballots just as with conventional optical scan, but using a special ballot marking pen. Marking a selection with this pen makes legible an otherwise invisible preprinted confirmation code. Confirmation codes are independent and random for each potential selection on each ballot. To verify that their individual votes are recorded correctly, voters can look up their ballot serial numbers online and verify that their confirmation codes are posted correctly. The confirmation codes do not allow voters to prove how they voted. However, the confirmation codes constitute convincing evidence of error or malfeasance in the event that incorrect codes are posted online. Correctness of the final tally with respect to the published codes is proven by election officials in a manner that can be verified by any interested party. Thus, compromise of either ballot chain of custody or the software systems cannot undetectably affect election integrity. Scantegrity II has been implemented and tested in small elections in which ballots were scanned either at the polling place or centrally. Preparations for its use in a public sector election have commenced.
David Chaum, Richard Carback, Jeremy Clark, Aleksander Essex, Stefan Popoveniuc, Ronald L. Rivest, Peter Y. A. Ryan, Emily Shen, Alan T. Sherman, Poorvi L. Vora
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.5