VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Shreyas Gupta
dblp:290/7231
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation · 100% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation › secure multiparty computation
secure auction |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Secure Vickrey Auctions with Rational Parties · CCS 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
auction design |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Secure Vickrey Auctions with Rational Parties · CCS 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
second-price auction |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Secure Vickrey Auctions with Rational Parties · CCS 2024 |
Cryptographic protocols and secure computation
secure multiparty computation |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Secure Vickrey Auctions with Rational Parties · CCS 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
utility modeling · 1.5game theory · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Secure Vickrey Auctions with Rational PartiesabstractIn this work, we construct a second price (Vickrey) auction protocol (SPA), which does not require any auctioneers and ensures total privacy in the presence of rational parties participating in the auction. In particular, the confidentiality of the highest bid and the identity of the second highest bidder are protected. We model the bidders participating in the second price auction as rational, computationally bounded and privacy-sensitive parties. These are self-interested agents who care about winning the auction more than learning about the private bids of other parties. A rational party does not deviate from the protocol arbitrarily but does so only for its own individual 'advantage' -- without any consideration for others. Such an advantage is modelled using suitable utility functions. Chaya Ganesh, Shreyas Gupta, Bhavana Kanukurthi, Girisha Shankar |
CCS | 2 |
| 2024 | SketchAnim: Real-time sketch animation transfer from videosabstractAbstract Animation of hand‐drawn sketches is an adorable art. It allows the animator to generate animations with expressive freedom and requires significant expertise. In this work, we introduce a novel sketch animation framework designed to address inherent challenges, such as motion extraction, motion transfer, and occlusion. The framework takes an exemplar video input featuring a moving object and utilizes a robust motion transfer technique to animate the input sketch. We show comparative evaluations that demonstrate the superior performance of our method over existing sketch animation techniques. Notably, our approach exhibits a higher level of user accessibility in contrast to conventional sketch‐based animation systems, positioning it as a promising contributor to the field of sketch animation. https://graphics-research-group.github.io/SketchAnim/ Gaurav Rai, Shreyas Gupta, Ojaswa Sharma |
Comput. Graph. Forum | 2 |
| 2024 | Bisimulation in model-changing modal logics: An algorithmic studyabstractAbstract We discuss the notion of bisimulation in various model-changing modal logics and provide an algorithmic study of the same. We provide a general algorithm which gives an overall procedure to check whether two models are bisimilar in all these logics. Through our algorithmic analyses we provide a PSPACE upper bound of the bisimulation/model comparison problem of all these modal logics. We also provide some insight into the higher complexity of the model comparison problem for these logics compared to that for the basic modal logic. Sujata Ghosh, Shreyas Gupta |
J. Log. Comput. | 2 |