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Kangqiao Zhao

dblp:292/0013 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0001-0389-0905ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
2 papers
Security and privacy of machine learning · 82% Cyber-physical and IoT security · 18%
Artificial intelligence
2 papers
3D vision · 57% Autonomous driving · 43%

Topics — the 8 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
physical adversarial attack
1.822026
Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving · AAAI 2026
VisionGuard: Secure and Robust Visual Perception of Autonomous Vehicles in Practice · CCS 2024
Robotics › Autonomous driving
perception
1.222026
Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving · AAAI 2026
VisionGuard: Secure and Robust Visual Perception of Autonomous Vehicles in Practice · CCS 2024
Computer vision › 3D vision › depth estimation
stereo depth estimation
1.012026
Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack
1.012026
Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving · AAAI 2026
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial robustness
0.812024
VisionGuard: Secure and Robust Visual Perception of Autonomous Vehicles in Practice · CCS 2024
Cyber-physical and IoT security
autonomous vehicle security
0.812024
VisionGuard: Secure and Robust Visual Perception of Autonomous Vehicles in Practice · CCS 2024
Computer vision › 3D vision
depth estimation
0.312026
Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving · AAAI 2026
Computer vision › 3D vision › stereo vision
stereo matching
0.312026
Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving · AAAI 2026

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

stereo matching rendering · 2.03d adversarial texture optimization · 2.0deep neural network · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 Cheating Stereo Matching in Full-Scale: Physical Adversarial Attack Against Binocular Depth Estimation in Autonomous Driving
abstract
Though deep neural models adopted to realize the perception of autonomous driving have proven vulnerable to adversarial examples, known attacks often leverage 2D patches and target mostly monocular perception. Therefore, the effectiveness of Physical Adversarial Examples (PAEs) on stereo-based binocular depth estimation remains largely unexplored. To this end, we propose the first texture-enabled physical adversarial attack against stereo matching models in the context of autonomous driving. Our method employs a 3D PAE with global camouflage texture rather than a local 2D patch-based one, ensuring both visual consistency and attack effectiveness across different viewpoints of stereo cameras. To cope with the disparity effect of these cameras, we also propose a new 3D stereo matching rendering module that allows the PAE to be aligned with real-world positions and headings in binocular vision. We further propose a novel merging attack that seamlessly blends the target into the environment through fine-grained PAE optimization. It has significantly enhanced stealth and lethality upon existing hiding attacks that fail to get seamlessly merged into the background. Extensive evaluations show that our PAEs can successfully fool the stereo models into producing erroneous depth information.
Kangqiao Zhao, Shuo Huai, Xurui Song, Jun Luo 0001
AAAI1
2024 VisionGuard: Secure and Robust Visual Perception of Autonomous Vehicles in Practice
abstract
Modern Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) implement the Visual Perception Module (VPM) to perceive their surroundings. This VPM adopts various Deep Neural Network (DNN) models to process the data collected from cameras and LiDAR. Prior studies have shown that these models are vulnerable to physical adversarial examples (PAEs), which pose a critical safety risk to the autonomous driving task. While a few defense methods have been proposed to safeguard AVs, most of them only target a limited set of attack types and specific scenarios, making them impractical for real-world protection.
Xingshuo Han, Haozhao Wang, Kangqiao Zhao, Gelei Deng, Yuan Xu 0033, Hangcheng Liu, Han Qiu 0001, Tianwei Zhang 0004
CCS3
2021 Reinforcement Learning for Quadruped Locomotion
Kangqiao Zhao, Feng Lin 0002, Seah Hock Soon
CGI1