Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Tanmay Gautam
dblp:293/9039
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Databases, data mining, and information retrieval
1 paper |
Information retrieval · 100% | |
| Artificial intelligence
2 papers |
Language models and text generation · 50% Optimization for machine learning · 38% Question answering and dialogue systems · 12% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 8 heaviest of 9, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Natural language and speech › Language models and text generation
large language model fine-tuning |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Variance-reduced Zeroth-Order Methods for Fine-Tuning Language Models · ICML 2024 |
Machine learning › Optimization for machine learning › black-box optimization
zeroth-order optimization |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Variance-reduced Zeroth-Order Methods for Fine-Tuning Language Models · ICML 2024 |
Information retrieval
ranking |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Engines · EMNLP 2024 |
Information retrieval › ranking
ranking manipulation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Engines · EMNLP 2024 |
Information retrieval
retrieval models |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Engines · EMNLP 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial attack |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Engines · EMNLP 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
prompt injection |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Engines · EMNLP 2024 |
Natural language and speech › Question answering and dialogue systems
conversational search |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search Engines · EMNLP 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
tree-of-attacks · 2.3jailbreaking · 2.3zeroth-order SGD · 0.8variance reduction · 0.8SVRG · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Ranking Manipulation for Conversational Search EnginesabstractMajor search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)generated content in response to user queries.These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation.Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings.This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines.To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of realworld consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem.Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position.We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products.Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai.Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work. 1 Samuel Pfrommer, Yatong Bai, Tanmay Gautam, Somayeh Sojoudi |
EMNLP | 3 |
| 2024 | Variance-reduced Zeroth-Order Methods for Fine-Tuning Language ModelsabstractFine-tuning language models (LMs) has demonstrated success in a wide array of downstream tasks. However, as LMs are scaled up, the memory requirements for backpropagation become prohibitively high. Zeroth-order (ZO) optimization methods can leverage memory-efficient forward passes to estimate gradients. More recently, MeZO, an adaptation of ZO-SGD, has been shown to consistently outperform zero-shot and in-context learning when combined with suitable task prompts. In this work, we couple ZO methods with variance reduction techniques to enhance stability and convergence for inference-based LM fine-tuning. We introduce Memory-Efficient Zeroth-Order Stochastic Variance-Reduced Gradient (MeZO-SVRG) and demonstrate its efficacy across multiple LM fine-tuning tasks, eliminating the reliance on task-specific prompts. Evaluated across a range of both masked and autoregressive LMs on benchmark GLUE tasks, MeZO-SVRG outperforms MeZO with up to 20% increase in test accuracies in both full- and partial-parameter fine-tuning settings. MeZO-SVRG benefits from reduced computation time as it often surpasses MeZO’s peak test accuracy with a $2\times$ reduction in GPU-hours. MeZO-SVRG significantly reduces the required memory footprint compared to first-order SGD, i.e. by $2\times$ for autoregressive models. Our experiments highlight that MeZO-SVRG’s memory savings progressively improve compared to SGD with larger batch sizes. Tanmay Gautam, Youngsuk Park, Parameswaran Raman, Wooseok Ha |
ICML | 1 |