Simulation modeling offers a flexible approach to constructing high-fidelity synthetic representations of complex real-world systems. However, the increased complexity of such models introduces additional complications, for example when carrying out statistical inference procedures. This has motivated a large and growing literature on likelihood-free or simulation-based inference methods, which approximate (e.g., Bayesian) inference without assuming access to the simulator’s intractable likelihood function. A hitherto neglected problem in the simulation-based Bayesian inference literature is the challenge of constructing minimally informative reference priors for complex simulation models. Such priors maximise an expected Kullback-Leibler distance from the prior to the posterior, thereby influencing posterior inferences minimally and enabling an “objective” approach to Bayesian inference that does not necessitate the incorporation of strong subjective prior beliefs. In this paper, we propose and test a selection of likelihood-free methods for learning reference priors for simulation models, using variational approximations to these priors and a variety of mutual information estimators. Our experiments demonstrate that good approximations to reference priors for simulation models are in this way attainable, providing a first step towards the development of likelihood-free objective Bayesian inference procedures.

Advanced reasoning models with agentic capabilities (AI agents) are deployed to interact with humans and to solve sequential decision‑making problems under (often approximate) utility functions and internal models. When such problems have resource or failure constraints where action sequences may be forcibly terminated once resources are exhausted, agents face implicit trade‑offs that reshape their utility-driven (rational) behaviour. Additionally, since these agents are typically commissioned by a human principal to act on their behalf, asymmetries in constraint exposure can give rise to previously unanticipated misalignment between human objectives and agent incentives. We formalise this setting through a survival bandit framework, provide theoretical and empirical results that quantify the impact of survival‑driven preference shifts, identify conditions under which misalignment emerges and propose mechanisms to mitigate the emergence of risk-seeking or risk-averse behaviours. As a result, this work aims to increase understanding and interpretability of emergent behaviours of AI agents operating under such survival pressure, and offer guidelines for safely deploying such AI systems in critical resource‑limited environments.

Large-scale simulation models of complex socio-technical systems provide decision-makers with high-fidelity testbeds in which policy interventions can be evaluated and _what-if_ scenarios explored. Unfortunately, the high computational cost of such models inhibits their widespread use in policy-making settings. Surrogate models can address these computational limitations, but to do so they must behave consistently with the simulator under interventions of interest. In this paper, we build upon recent developments in causal abstractions to develop a framework for learning interventionally consistent surrogate models for large-scale, complex simulation models. We provide theoretical results showing that our proposed approach induces surrogates to behave consistently with high probability with respect to the simulator across interventions of interest, facilitating rapid experimentation with policy interventions in complex systems. We further demonstrate with empirical studies that conventionally trained surrogates can misjudge the effect of interventions and misguide decision-makers towards suboptimal interventions, while surrogates trained for _interventional_ consistency with our method closely mimic the behaviour of the original simulator under interventions of interest.

Multi-armed bandits (MAB) and causal MABs (CMAB) are established frameworks for decision-making problems. The majority of prior work typically studies and solves individual MAB and CMAB in isolation for a given problem and associated data. However, decision-makers are often faced with multiple related problems and multi-scale observations where joint formulations are needed in order to efficiently exploit the problem structures and data dependencies. Transfer learning for CMABs addresses the situation where models are defined on identical variables, although causal connections may differ. In this work, we extend transfer learning to setups involving CMABs defined on potentially different variables, with varying degrees of granularity, and related via an abstraction map. Formally, we introduce the problem of causally abstracted MABs (CAMABs) by relying on the theory of causal abstraction in order to express a rigorous abstraction map. We propose algorithms to learn in a CAMAB, and study their regret. We illustrate the limitations and the strengths of our algorithms on a real-world scenario related to online advertising.

In financial credit networks, prepayments enable a firm to settle its debt obligations ahead of an agreed-upon due date. Prepayments have a transformative impact on the structure of networks, influencing the financial well-being (utility) of individual firms. This study investigates prepayments from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. We first establish the computational complexity of finding prepayments that maximize welfare, assuming global coordination among firms in the financial network. Subsequently, our focus shifts to understanding the strategic behavior of individual firms in the presence of prepayments. We introduce a prepayment game where firms strategically make prepayments, delineating the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria and analyzing the price of anarchy (stability) within this game. Recognizing the computational challenges associated with determining Nash equilibria in prepayment games, we use a simulation-based approach, known as empirical game-theoretic analysis (EGTA). Through EGTA, we are able to find Nash equilibria among a carefully-chosen set of heuristic strategies. By examining the equilibrium behavior of firms, we outline the characteristics of high-performing strategies for strategic prepayments and establish connections between our empirical and theoretical findings.

Abstract In reinforcement learning (RL), an agent must explore an initially unknown environment in order to learn a desired behaviour. When RL agents are deployed in real world environments, safety is of primary concern. Constrained Markov decision processes (CMDPs) can provide long-term safety constraints; however, the agent may violate the constraints in an effort to explore its environment. This paper proposes a model-based RL algorithm called Explicit Explore, Exploit, or Escape ( $$E^{4}$$ E 4 ), which extends the Explicit Explore or Exploit ( $$E^{3}$$ E 3 ) algorithm to a robust CMDP setting. $$E^4$$ E 4 explicitly separates exploitation, exploration, and escape CMDPs, allowing targeted policies for policy improvement across known states, discovery of unknown states, as well as safe return to known states. $$E^4$$ E 4 robustly optimises these policies on the worst-case CMDP from a set of CMDP models consistent with the empirical observations of the deployment environment. Theoretical results show that $$E^4$$ E 4 finds a near-optimal constraint-satisfying policy in polynomial time whilst satisfying safety constraints throughout the learning process. We then discuss $$E^4$$ E 4 as a practical algorithmic framework, including robust-constrained offline optimisation algorithms, the design of uncertainty sets for the transition dynamics of unknown states, and how to further leverage empirical observations and prior knowledge to relax some of the worst-case assumptions underlying the theory.

We consider a sequential blocked matching (SBM) model where strategic agents repeatedly report ordinal preferences over a set of services to a central planner. The planner's goal is to elicit agents' true preferences and design a policy that matches services to agents in order to maximize the expected social welfare with the added constraint that each matched service can be blocked or unavailable for a number of time periods. Naturally, SBM models the repeated allocation of reusable services to a set of agents where each allocated service becomes unavailable for a fixed duration. We first consider the offline SBM setting, where the strategic agents are aware of their true preferences. We measure the performance of any policy by distortion, the worst-case multiplicative approximation guaranteed by any policy. For the setting with s services, we establish lower bounds of Ω(s) and Ω(√s) on the distortions of any deterministic and randomised mechanisms, respectively. We complement these results by providing approximately truthful, measured by incentive ratio, deterministic and randomised policies based on random serial dictatorship which match our lower bounds. Our results show that there is a significant improvement if one considers the class of randomised policies. Finally, we consider the online SBM setting with bandit feedback where each agent is initially unaware of her true preferences, and the planner must facilitate each agent in the learning of their preferences through the matching of services over time. We design an approximately truthful mechanism based on the explore-then-commit paradigm, which achieves logarithmic dynamic approximate regret.