The rise of 5G and IoT has shifted secure communication from centralized and homogeneous to a landscape of heterogeneous mobile devices constantly travelling between myriad networks. In such environments, it is desirable for devices to securely extend their connection from one network to another, often referred to as a handover. In this work we introduce the first cryptographic formalisation of secure handover schemes. We leverage our formalisation to propose path privacy, a novel security property for handovers that has hitherto remained unexplored. We further develop a syntax for secure handovers, and identify security properties appropriate for secure handover schemes. Finally, we introduce a generic handover scheme that captures all the strong notions of security we have identified, combining our novel path privacy concept with other security properties characteristic to existing handover schemes, demonstrating the robustness and versatility of our framework.

The rapid digitization of aviation communication and its dependent critical operations demand secure protocols that address domain-specific security requirements within the unique functional constraints of the aviation industry. These secure protocols must provide sufficient security against current and possible future attackers, given the inherent nature of the aviation community, that is highly complex and averse to frequent upgrades as well as its high safety and cost considerations. In this work we propose a pair of quantum-secure hybrid key exchange protocols ($\mathsf {PQAG}\hbox{-}\mathsf {KEM}$and$\mathsf {PQAG}\hbox{-}\mathsf {SIG}$) to secure communication between aircrafts in-flight and ground stations.$\mathsf {PQAG}\hbox{-}\mathsf {KEM}$leverages post-quantum and classical Key Encapsulation Mechanisms ($\mathsf {KEM}$s) to ensure the hybrid security of the protocol against classical as well as future quantum adversaries.$\mathsf {PQAG}\hbox{-}\mathsf {SIG}$, alternatively, uses quantum-safe digital signatures to achieve authentication security. We provide an implementation of both$\mathsf {PQAG}\hbox{-}\mathsf {KEM}$and$\mathsf {PQAG}\hbox{-}\mathsf {SIG}$, and compare favourably with current state-of-the-art secure avionic protocols. Finally, we provide a formal analysis of our new$\mathsf {PQAG}$protocols in a strong hybrid key exchange framework.

Cybersecurity-related concepts can be difficult to explain or summarise. The complexity associated with these concepts is compounded by the impact of rapid technological changes and the contextual nature of the meaning ascribed to the various themes. Since visual imagery is often employed in articulation and explanation, we conducted a study in which we asked participants to sketch their understanding of cybersecurity concepts. Based on an analysis of these sketches and subsequent discussions with participants, we make the case for the use of sketching and visuals as a tool for cybersecurity research. Our collection of sketches and icons can further serve as the seed for a visual vocabulary for cybersecurity-related interfaces and communication.