VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Justus von Brandt
dblp:295/9948
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Detecting Unknown DGAs without Context InformationabstractNew malware emerges at a rapid pace and often incorporates Domain Generation Algorithms (DGAs) to avoid blocking the malware’s connection to the command and control (C2) server. Current state-of-the-art classifiers are able to separate benign from malicious domains (binary classification) and attribute them with high probability to the DGAs that generated them (multiclass classification). While binary classifiers can label domains of yet unknown DGAs as malicious, multiclass classifiers can only assign domains to DGAs that are known at the time of training, limiting the ability to uncover new malware families. In this work, we perform a comprehensive study on the detection of new DGAs, which includes an evaluation of 59,690 classifiers. We examine four different approaches in 15 different configurations and propose a simple yet effective approach based on the combination of a softmax classifier and regular expressions (regexes) to detect multiple unknown DGAs with high probability. At the same time, our approach retains state-of-the-art classification performance for known DGAs. Our evaluation is based on a leave-one-group-out cross-validation with a total of 94 DGA families. By using the maximum number of known DGAs, our evaluation scenario is particularly difficult and close to the real world. All of the approaches examined are privacy-preserving, since they operate without context and exclusively on a single domain to be classified. We round up our study with a thorough discussion of class-incremental learning strategies that can adapt an existing classifier to newly discovered classes. Arthur Drichel, Justus von Brandt, Ulrike Meyer |
ARES | 2 |
| 2021 | Finding Phish in a Haystack: A Pipeline for Phishing Classification on Certificate Transparency LogsabstractCurrent popular phishing prevention techniques mainly utilize reactive blocklists, which leave a “window of opportunity” for attackers during which victims are unprotected. One possible approach to shorten this window aims to detect phishing attacks earlier, during website preparation, by monitoring Certificate Transparency (CT) logs. Previous attempts to work with CT log data for phishing classification exist, however they lack evaluations on actual CT log data. In this paper, we present a pipeline that facilitates such evaluations by addressing a number of problems when working with CT log data. The pipeline includes dataset creation, training, and past or live classification of CT logs. Its modular structure makes it possible to easily exchange classifiers or verification sources to support ground truth labeling efforts and classifier comparisons. We test the pipeline on a number of new and existing classifiers, and find a general potential to improve classifiers for this scenario in the future. We publish the source code of the pipeline and the used datasets along with this paper [12], thus making future research in this direction more accessible. Arthur Drichel, Vincent Drury, Justus von Brandt, Ulrike Meyer |
ARES | 3 |