VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Katharina Heidler
dblp:296/9902 · also Katharina Kreuzer
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-4621-734XORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Theory of computation · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Formalizing the One-Way to Hiding TheoremabstractAs the standardization process for post-quantum cryptography progresses, the need for computer-verified security proofs against classical and quantum attackers increases. Even though some tools are already tackling this issue, none are foundational. We take a first step in this direction and present a complete formalization of the One-way to Hiding (O2H) Theorem, a central theorem for security proofs against quantum attackers. With this new formalization, we build more secure foundations for proof-checking tools in the quantum setting. Using the theorem prover Isabelle, we verify the semi-classical O2H Theorem by Ambainis, Hamburg and Unruh (Crypto 2019) in different variations. We also give a novel (and for the formalization simpler) proof to the O2H Theorem for mixed states and extend the theorem to non-terminating adversaries. This work provides a theoretical and foundational background for several verification tools and for security proofs in the quantum setting. Katharina Heidler, Dominique Unruh |
CPP | 1 |
| 2024 | Verification of Correctness and Security Properties for CRYSTALS-KYBERabstractSince the post-quantum crypto system CRYSTALS-KYBER has been chosen for standardization by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (US), a formal verification of its correctness and security properties becomes even more relevant. Using the automated theorem prover Isabelle, we are able to formalize the algorithm specifications and parameter sets of Kyber's public key encryption scheme and verify the$\delta$-correctness and indistinguishability under chosen plaintext attack property. However, during the formalization process, several gaps in the pen-and-paper proofs were discovered. All but one gap concerning the error bound$\delta$could be filled. Calculations in smaller dimensions give examples where the bound$\delta$is less than the actual error term, violating the correctness property. Since the correctness proof could be formalized up to an application of the module-Learning-with-Errors assumption, we believe that the discrepancy of the original error bound and the formalized version is relatively small. Thus the correctness could be formalized up to a minimal change to the error bound. Katharina Heidler |
CSF | 1 |
| 2023 | Verification of NP-Hardness Reduction Functions for Exact Lattice ProblemsabstractAbstract This paper describes the formal verification of NP-hardness reduction functions of two key problems relevant in algebraic lattice theory: the closest vector problem and the shortest vector problem, both in the infinity norm. The formalization uncovered a number of problems with the existing proofs in the literature. The paper describes how these problems were corrected in the formalization. The work was carried out in the proof assistant Isabelle. Katharina Heidler, Tobias Nipkow |
CADE | 1 |