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Sina Moghadas Khorasani

dblp:297/4186 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2021
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 75% Mathematical optimization · 25%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design
contest design
0.512021
Optimal Feedback in Contests · EC 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › non-cooperative game › dynamic games
dynamic contest
0.512021
Optimal Feedback in Contests · EC 2021
Mathematical optimization › sequential decision making
feedback policy
0.512021
Optimal Feedback in Contests · EC 2021
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › resource allocation
prize allocation
0.512021
Optimal Feedback in Contests · EC 2021

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

mechanism design · 0.5dynamic optimization · 0.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2021 Optimal Feedback in Contests
abstract
We derive an optimal dynamic contest for environments where effort can be monitored only through a coarse, binary performance measure and the principal chooses prize-allocation and termination rules together with a real-time feedback policy for the contestants. The optimal contest takes a stark cyclical form: contestants are kept fully apprised of their own successes, and at the end of each fixed-length cycle, if at least one agent has succeeded, the contest ends and the prize is shared equally among all successful agents irrespective of when they succeeded; otherwise, the designer informs all contestants that nobody has yet succeeded and the contest resets. Applications include promotions, innovation contests, and proof-of-work protocols.
Jeffrey Ely, George Georgiadis, Sina Moghadas Khorasani, Luis Rayo
EC3