Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Bharat Manvi
dblp:297/4805
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
1as first author
1since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Theoretical computer science
1 paper |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
auction theory |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis · IJCAI 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › mechanism design › auction design
double auction |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis · IJCAI 2024 |
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
equilibrium analysis |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis · IJCAI 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
reinforcement learning · 0.8equilibrium analysis · 0.8
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Optimizing Prosumer Policies in Periodic Double Auctions Inspired by Equilibrium Analysis
Bharat Manvi, Sanjay Chandlekar, Easwar Subramanian |
IJCAI | 1 |