Accurately modeling opponent behaviors and integrating strategy are key challenges for multi-issue automated negotiation. Existing approaches often isolate preference learning or trend prediction and lack a unified cognitive structure with coordinated reasoning. This paper proposes a BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention)-based opponent modeling and strategy generation framework. The framework analyzes opponent responses (Belief), predicts preference weights and the utility function (Desire), and infers utilities of future offers (Intention). Building on these predictions, we design a responsive strategy, enabling gradual concessions and balanced outcomes. Our main contributions are: D-MBUE in the Desire module, I-DABI in the Intention module, and the BDI Negotiator on top of the modeling modules. Experiments on 45 standard negotiation domains and against 12 representative opponents demonstrate the effectiveness of our BDI framework.

The Nash Equilibrium (NE) assumes rational play in imperfect-information Extensive-Form Games (EFGs) but fails to ensure optimal strategies for off-equilibrium branches of the game tree, potentially leading to suboptimal outcomes in practical settings. To address this, the Extensive-Form Perfect Equilibrium (EFPE), a refinement of NE, introduces controlled perturbations to model potential player errors. However, existing EFPE-finding algorithms, which typically rely on average strategy convergence and fixed perturbations, face significant limitations: computing average strategies incurs high computational costs and approximation errors, while fixed perturbations create a trade-off between NE approximation accuracy and the convergence rate of NE refinements. To tackle these challenges, we propose an efficient adaptive regret minimization algorithm for computing approximate EFPE, achieving last-iterate convergence in two-player zero-sum EFGs. Our approach introduces Reward Transformation Counterfactual Regret Minimization (RTCFR) to solve perturbed games and defines a novel metric, the Information Set Nash Equilibrium (ISNE), to dynamically adjust perturbations. Theoretical analysis confirms convergence to EFPE, and experimental results demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art algorithms in both NE and EFPE-finding tasks.

Counterfactual regret minimization (CFR) is an effective algorithm for solving extensive‐form games with imperfect information (IIEGs). However, CFR is only allowed to be applied in known environments, where the transition function of the chance player and the reward function of the terminal node in IIEGs are known. In uncertain situations, such as reinforcement learning (RL) problems, CFR is not applicable. Thus, applying CFR in unknown environments is a significant challenge that can also address some difficulties in the real world. Currently, advanced solutions require more interactions with the environment and are limited by large single‐sampling variances to narrow the gap with the real environment. In this paper, we propose a method that combines CFR with information gain to compute the Nash equilibrium (NE) of IIEGs with unknown environments. We use a curiosity‐driven approach to explore unknown environments and minimize the discrepancy between uncertain and real environments. In addition, by incorporating information into the reward, the average strategy calculated by CFR can be directly implemented as the interaction policy with the environment, thereby improving the exploration efficiency of our method in uncertain environments. Through experiments on standard testbeds such as Kuhn poker and Leduc poker, our method significantly reduces the number of interactions with the environment compared to the different baselines and computes a more accurate approximate NE within the same number of interaction rounds.