Modern HBM-based memory systems have evolved over generations while retaining cache line granularity accesses. Preserving this fine granularity necessitated the introduction of bank groups and pseudo channels. These structures expand timing parameters and control overhead, significantly increasing memory controller scheduling complexity. Large language models (LLMs) now dominate deep learning workloads, streaming contiguous data blocks ranging from several kilobytes to megabytes per operation. In a conventional HBM-based memory system, these transfers are fragmented into hundreds of 32B cache line transactions. This forces the memory controller to employ unnecessarily intricate scheduling, leading to growing inefficiency. To address this problem, we propose RoMe. RoMe accesses DRAM at row granularity and removes columns, bank groups, and pseudo channels from the memory interface. This design simplifies memory scheduling, thereby requiring fewer pins per channel. The freed pins are aggregated to form additional channels, increasing overall bandwidth by$\text{1 2. 5 \%}$with minimal extra pins. RoMe demonstrates how memory scheduling logic can be significantly simplified for representative LLM workloads, and presents an alternative approach for next-generation HBM-based memory systems achieving increased bandwidth with minimal hardware overhead.

Compute Express Link (CXL) fundamentally shifts the memory abstraction boundary, moving memory management functions from the host CPU to external controllers. While this decoupling allows hyperscalers to integrate diverse media, such as cost-effective, recycled DDR4 modules, it transforms the memory controller into a complex system with new integration challenges. First, we uncover that integrating CXL and memory controller IPs via the industry-standard AXI interconnect creates critical bottlenecks. We demonstrate that variable access latency and out-of-order responses, essential for CXL, can quickly saturate the limited AXI tag space, limiting bandwidth and even causing system hangs in commercial platforms. However, this decoupled architecture also creates a unique opportunity: the CXL controller can exploit its support for variable-latency responses and near-memory processing to implement transparent reliability and security mechanisms. We propose ReScue, a suite of hardware solutions implemented and validated on an Intel Agilex platform. ReScue-R leverages CXL's variable access latency and out-of-order responses to transparently retrieve remapping addresses stored within faulty blocks. By utilizing a Bloom filter to predict faults and minimize overhead, it achieves fault tolerance$9.6 \times 10^{4}$times higher than standard SECDED ECC with only 0.2% performance degradation. ReScue-S addresses security; after demonstrating the first successful Row Hammer (RH) bit flips and physical-address reconstruction on a CXL system, we show that ReScue-S can shape response latencies to prevent timing-based side-channel attacks with only 1.1% performance degradation. Finally, we propose a solution to the discovered AXI-induced system hangs to ensure stable CXL operation.

A decade after its academic introduction, RowHammer (RH) remains a moving target that continues to challenge both the industry and academia. With its potential to serve as a critical attack vector, the ever-decreasing RH threshold now threatens DRAM process technology scaling, with a superlinearly increasing cost of RH protection solutions. Due to their generality and relatively lower performance costs, architectural RH solutions are the first line of defense against RH. However, the field is fragmented with varying views of the problem, terminologies, and even threat models. In this paper, we systematize architectural RH defenses from the last decade through the lens of streaming algorithms. We provide a taxonomy that encompasses 48 different works. We map multiple architectural RH defenses to the classical streaming algorithms, which extends to multiple proposals that did not identify this link. We also provide two practitioner guides. The first guide analyzes which algorithm best fits a given RHTH, location, process technology, storage type, and mitigative action. The second guide encourages future research to consult existing algorithms when architecting RH defenses. We illustrate this by demonstrating how Reservoir-Sampling can improve related RH defenses, and also introduce StickySampling that can provide mathematical security that related studies do not guarantee.

CXL has emerged as a promising memory interface that can cost-effectively expand the capacity and bandwidth of a memory system, complementing the traditional DDR interface. However, CXL DRAM presents 2-3x longer access latency than DDR DRAM, forming a tiered-memory system that demands an effective and efficient page-migration solution. Although many page-migration solutions have been proposed for past tiered-memory systems, they have achieved limited success. To tackle the challenge of managing tiered-memory systems, this work first presents a CXL-driven profiling solution to precisely and transparently count the number of accesses to every 4KB page and 64B word in CXL DRAM. Second, using the profiling solution, this work uncovers that (1) widely used CPU-driven page-migration solutions often identify warm pages as hot pages, and (2) certain applications have sparse hot pages, where only a small percentage of words in each of these pages are frequently accessed. Besides, this work demonstrates that the performance overhead of identifying hot pages is sometimes high enough to degrade application performance. Lastly, this work presents M5, a platform designed to facilitate the development of effective CXL-driven page-migration solutions, providing hardware-based hot-page and hot-word trackers in the CXL controller. On average, M5 can identify 47% hotter pages and offer 14% higher performance than the best CPU-driven page-migration solution, even with a simple policy.

The Transformer-based generative model (TbGM), comprising summarization (Sum) and generation (Gen) stages, has demonstrated unprecedented generative performance across a wide range of applications. However, it also demands immense amounts of compute and memory resources. Especially, the Gen stages, consisting of the attention and fully-connected (FC) layers, dominate the overall execution time. Meanwhile, we reveal that the conventional system with GPUs used for TbGM inference cannot efficiently execute the attention layer, even with batching, due to various constraints. To address this inefficiency, we first propose AttAcc, a processing-in-memory (PIM) architecture for efficient execution of the attention layer. Subsequently, for the end-to-end acceleration of TbGM inference, we propose a novel heterogeneous system architecture and optimizations that strategically use xPU and PIM together. It leverages the high memory bandwidth of AttAcc for the attention layer and the powerful compute capability of the conventional system for the FC layer. Lastly, we demonstrate that our GPU-PIM system outperforms the conventional system with the same memory capacity, improving performance and energy efficiency of running a 175B TbGM by up to 2.81× and 2.67×, respectively.

Row Hammer (RH) has been demonstrated as a security vulnerability in modern systems. Although commodity CPUs can handle RH-induced single-bit errors in DRAM through ECC, RH can still give rise to multi-bit uncorrectable errors (UEs) and crash the systems. Meanwhile, recent work has indicated that the DRAM cells vulnerable to RH are determined by manufacturing imperfections and resulting defects. Taking one step further from the recent work, we first conduct RH experiments on contemporary DRAM modules for 3 weeks. This demonstrates that RH-induced UEs occur only at specific DRAM addresses (RH-UE-vulnerable addresses) and the percentage of such addresses is small in these DRAM modules. Second, to protect the systems from RH-induced UEs, we propose two RH defense solutions: H- and S-TAROT (TArgeted ROw-Hammer Therapy). H-TAROT is a software-based solution running on the host CPU. It obtains RH-UE-vulnerable addresses during the system boot and then periodically accesses such addresses before UEs may occur. Since it accesses only a small percentage of addresses, it does not incur a notable performance penalty for throughput applications (e.g., a 1.5% increase in execution time of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite running on a system even with 128GB of DRAM). Yet, it imposes a significant performance penalty on latency-sensitive applications (e.g., a 28.2% increase in tail latency of Redis). To minimize the performance penalty, for a system with a SmartNIC (SNIC), S-TAROT offloads H-TAROT from the host CPU to the SNIC CPU. Our experiment shows that S-TAROT increases the execution time and tail latency of the SPECrate 2017 benchmark suite and Redis by only 0.1% and 1.0%, respectively.

The demand for precise information on DRAM microarchitectures and error characteristics has surged, driven by the need to explore processing in memory, enhance reliability, and mitigate security vulnerability. Nonetheless, DRAM manufacturers have disclosed only a limited amount of information, making it difficult to find specific information on their DRAM microarchitectures. This paper addresses this gap by presenting more rigorous findings on the microarchitectures of commodity DRAM chips and their impacts on the characteristics of activate-induced bitflips (AIBs), such as RowHammer and RowPress. The previous studies have also attempted to understand the DRAM microarchitectures and associated behaviors, but we have found some of their results to be misled by inaccurate address mapping and internal data swizzling, or lack of a deeper understanding of the modern DRAM cell structure. For accurate and efficient reverse-engineering, we use three tools: AIBs, retention time test, and RowCopy, which can be cross-validated. With these three tools, we first take a macroscopic view of modern DRAM chips to uncover the size, structure, and operation of their subarrays, memory array tiles (MATs), and rows. Then, we analyze AIB characteristics based on the microscopic view of the DRAM microarchitecture, such as 6F2cell layout, through which we rectify misunderstandings regarding AIBs and discover a new data pattern that accelerates AIBs. Lastly, based on our findings at both macroscopic and microscopic levels, we identify previously unknown AIB vulnerabilities and propose a simple yet effective protection solution.

As Row Hammer (RH) attacks have been a critical threat to computer systems, numerous hardware-based (HWbased) RH mitigation strategies have been proposed. However, the advent of non-adjacent RH attacks and lower RH thresholds significantly increase the area and performance overhead of these prior solutions due to their conservative design characteristics.We propose a new in-DRAM RH protection solution named Shuffling Aggressor DRAM Rows (SHADOW). SHADOW dynamically randomizes DRAM row mapping information, preventing an attacker from targeting a specific victim row that may hold critical data. SHADOW is robust against non-adjacent RH attacks because it utilizes the in-DRAM row-shuffle technique. To realize the in-DRAM row-shuffle operation with low performance and energy overhead, we use a novel DRAM microarchitecture optimization technique. We also utilize the recently introduced JEDEC RFM interface to enable in-DRAM RH mitigation without any DRAM interface changes. By exploiting an additional DRAM row per subarray, SHADOW does not require costly SRAM- or CAM-based tracking structures other than intrinsic counters for the RFM interface. We demonstrate the strong probabilistic protection of SHADOW against RH attacks through adversarial pattern analysis and highlight the compelling performance, area, and energy overheads compared to those of state-of-the-art HW-based RH prevention solutions.

Error-correcting code (ECC) has been widely used in DRAM-based memory systems to address the exacerbating random errors following the fabrication process scaling. However, ECCs including the strong form of Chipkill have not been so effective against Row Hammer (RH), which incurs bursts of errors discretely corrupting the whole row beyond the ECC correction capability.

Since its public introduction in the mid-2010s, the Row Hammer (RH) phenomenon has drawn significant attention from the research community due to its security implications. Although many RH-protection schemes have been proposed by processor vendors, DRAM manufacturers, and academia, they still have shortcomings. Solutions implemented in the memory controller (MC) incur increasingly higher costs due to their conservative design for the worst case in terms of the number of DRAM banks and RH threshold to support. Meanwhile, DRAM-side implementation either has a limited time margin for RH-protection measures or requires extensive modifications to the standard DRAM interface. Recently, a new command for RH-protection has been introduced in the DDR5/LPDDR5 standards, referred to as refresh management (RFM). RFM enables the separation of the tasks for RH-protection to both MC and DRAM by having the former generate an RFM command at a specific activation frequency and the latter take proper RH-protection measures within a given time window. Although promising, no existing study presents and analyzes RFM-based solutions for RH-protection. In this paper, we propose Mithril, the first RFM interface-compatible, DRAM-MC cooperative RH-protection scheme providing deterministic protection guarantees. Mithril has minimal energy overheads for common use cases without adversarial memory access patterns. We also introduce Mithril+, an optional extension to provide minimal performance overheads at the expense of a tiny modification to the MC, while utilizing existing DRAM commands.

Homomorphic encryption (HE) enables the secure offloading of computations to the cloud by providing computation on encrypted data (ciphertexts). HE is based on noisy encryption schemes in which noise accumulates as more computations are applied to the data. The limited number of operations applicable to the data prevents practical applications from exploiting HE. Bootstrapping enables an unlimited number of operations or fully HE (FHE) by refreshing the ciphertext. Unfortunately, bootstrapping requires a significant amount of additional computation and memory bandwidth as well. Prior works have proposed hardware accelerators for computation primitives of FHE. However, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first to propose a hardware FHE accelerator that supports bootstrapping as a first-class citizen.

The CUDA core of NVIDIA GPUs had been one of the most efficient computation units for parallel computing. However, recent rapid developments in deep neural networks demand an even higher level of computational performance. To meet this requirement, NVIDIA has introduced the Tensor core in recent generations. However, their impressive enhancements in computational performance have newly brought high pressure on the memory hierarchy. In this paper, first we identify the required memory bandwidth in the memory hierarchy as the computational performance increases in actual GPU hardware. Through a comparison of the CUDA core and the Tensor core in V100, we find that the tremendous performance increase of the Tensor core requires much higher memory bandwidth than that in the CUDA core. Moreover, we thoroughly investigate memory bandwidth requirement over Tensor core generations of V100, RTX TITAN, and A100. Lastly, we analyze a hypothetical next-generation Tensor core introduced by NVIDIA through a GPU simulation, through which we propose an inter-warp multicasting microarchitecture that reduces redundant shared memory (SMEM) traffic during the GEMM process. Our evaluation shows that inter-warp multicasting reduces the SMEM bandwidth pressure by 33% and improves the performance by 19% on average in all layers of ResNet-152 and BERT-Large.