Elijah Taylor

dblp:30/9698 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
0since 2021 · last 2011
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Runtime systems and virtual machines · 77% Programming languages and type systems · 23%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › operating system security
sandboxing
0.112011
Language-independent sandboxing of just-in-time compilation and self-modifying code · PLDI 2011
Runtime systems and virtual machines › dynamic compilation
just-in-time compilation
0.112011
Language-independent sandboxing of just-in-time compilation and self-modifying code · PLDI 2011
Programming languages and type systems
language-based security
0.012011
Language-independent sandboxing of just-in-time compilation and self-modifying code · PLDI 2011

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

sandboxing · 0.2code generation · 0.2
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2011 Language-independent sandboxing of just-in-time compilation and self-modifying code
abstract
When dealing with dynamic, untrusted content, such as on the Web, software behavior must be sandboxed, typically through use of a language like JavaScript. However, even for such specially-designed languages, it is difficult to ensure the safety of highly-optimized, dynamic language runtimes which, for efficiency, rely on advanced techniques such as Just-In-Time (JIT) compilation, large libraries of native-code support routines, and intricate mechanisms for multi-threading and garbage collection. Each new runtime provides a new potential attack surface and this security risk raises a barrier to the adoption of new languages for creating untrusted content.
Jason Ansel, Petr Marchenko, Úlfar Erlingsson, Elijah Taylor, Brad Chen, Derek L. Schuff, David Sehr, Cliff Biffle, Bennet Yee
PLDI4