Leona Lassak

dblp:301/5833 · DBLP profile ↗
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7ranked-venue papers
5as first author
7since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0001-8309-3211ORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 5 · 4 first-author · 5 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Balancing Privacy and Data Utilization: A Comparative Vignette Study on User Acceptance of Data Trustees in Germany and the US
Leona Lassak, Hanna Püschel, Oliver D. Reithmaier, Tobias Gostomzyk, Markus Dürmuth
NDSS1
2025 From TOTPs to Security Keys: Studying the Reality of Passwordless FIDO2 Authentication With PIN and Biometrics in a Corporate Environment
Leona Lassak, Nicklas Lindemann, Marvin Kowalewski
SOUPS1
2025 Scanned and Scammed: Insecurity by ObsQRity? Measuring User Susceptibility and Awareness of QR Code-Based Attacks
Marvin Kowalewski, Leona Lassak, Markus Dürmuth, Theodor Schnitzler
USENIX Security Symposium2
2024 A Comparative Long-Term Study of Fallback Authentication Schemes
abstract
Fallback authentication, the process of re-establishing access to an account when the primary authenticator is unavailable, holds critical significance. Approaches range from secondary channels like email and SMS to personal knowledge questions (PKQs) and social authentication. A key difference to primary authentication is that the duration between enrollment and authentication can be much longer, typically months or years. However, few systems have been studied over extended timeframes, making it difficult to know how well these systems truly help users recover their accounts. We also lack meaningful comparisons of schemes as most prior work examined two mechanisms at most. We report the results of a long-term user study of the usability of fallback authentication over 18 months to provide a fair comparison of the four most commonly used fallback authentication methods. We show that users prefer email and SMS-based methods, while mechanisms based on PKQs and trustees lag regarding successful resets and convenience.
Leona Lassak, Philipp Markert, Maximilian Golla, Elizabeth Stobert, Markus Dürmuth
CHI1
2024 Understanding Users' Interaction with Login Notifications
abstract
Login notifications intend to inform users about sign-ins and help them protect their accounts from unauthorized access. Notifications are usually sent if a login deviates from previous ones, potentially indicating malicious activity. They contain information like the location, date, time, and device used to sign in. Users are challenged to verify whether they recognize the login (because it was them or someone they know) or to protect their account from unwanted access. In a user study, we explore users’ comprehension, reactions, and expectations of login notifications. We utilize two treatments to measure users’ behavior in response to notifications sent for a login they initiated or based on a malicious actor relying on statistical sign-in information. We find that users identify legitimate logins but need more support to halt malicious sign-ins. We discuss the identified problems and give recommendations for service providers to ensure usable and secure logins for everyone.
Philipp Markert, Leona Lassak, Maximilian Golla, Markus Dürmuth
CHI2
2024 Why Aren't We Using Passkeys? Obstacles Companies Face Deploying FIDO2 Passwordless Authentication
Leona Lassak, Elleen Pan, Blase Ur, Maximilian Golla
USENIX Security Symposium1
2021 "It's Stored, Hopefully, on an Encrypted Server": Mitigating Users' Misconceptions About FIDO2 Biometric WebAuthn
Leona Lassak, Annika Hildebrandt, Maximilian Golla, Blase Ur
USENIX Security Symposium1