Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Nathan Daniel Schiele
dblp:303/4411
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0003-1186-1503ORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 2 · 2 first-author · 2 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer graphics and multimedia
1 paper |
Visualization and visual analytics · 100% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 77% Systems and software security · 23% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security
security modeling |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | A limited technical background is sufficient for attack-defense tree acceptability · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Visualization and visual analytics › graph visualization
adjacency matrix |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Comparative Evaluation of Bipartite, Node-Link, and Matrix-Based Network Representations · IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 2023 |
Visualization and visual analytics
graph visualization |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Comparative Evaluation of Bipartite, Node-Link, and Matrix-Based Network Representations · IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 2023 |
Visualization and visual analytics › graph visualization
node-link diagram |
0.7 | 1 | 2023 | Comparative Evaluation of Bipartite, Node-Link, and Matrix-Based Network Representations · IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 2023 |
Systems and software security › security engineering
threat modeling |
0.3 | 1 | 2025 | A limited technical background is sufficient for attack-defense tree acceptability · USENIX Security Symposium 2025 |
Visualization and visual analytics › visualization evaluation
user study |
0.2 | 1 | 2023 | Comparative Evaluation of Bipartite, Node-Link, and Matrix-Based Network Representations · IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. 2023 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
user study · 0.9attack-defense tree analysis · 0.9crowdsourced user study · 0.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Empirical assessment of the perception of graphical threat model acceptabilityabstractThreat modeling (TM) is an important aspect of risk analysis and secure software engineering. Graphical threat models are a recommended tool to analyze and communicate threat information. However, the comparison of different graphical threat models, and the acceptability of these threat models for an audience with a limited technical background is not well understood, despite these users making up a sizable portion of the cybersecurity industry. We seek to compare the acceptability of three general, graphical threat models, Attack-Defense Trees (ADTs), Attack Graphs (AGs), and CORAS, for users with a limited technical background. We conducted a laboratory study with 38 bachelor students who completed tasks with the three threat models across three different scenarios assigned using a Latin square design. Threat model submissions were qualitatively analyzed, and participants filled out a perception questionnaire based on the Method Evaluation Model (MEM). We find that both ADTs and CORAS are broadly acceptable for a wide range of scenarios, and both could be applied successfully by users with a limited technical background; further, we also find that the lack of a specific tool for AGs may have impacted the perceived usefulness of AGs. We can recommend that users with a limited technical background use ADTs or CORAS as a general graphical TM method. Further research on the acceptability of AGs to such an audience and the effect of a dedicated TM tool support is needed. Nathan Daniel Schiele, Olga Gadyatskaya |
APSEC | 1 |
| 2025 | A limited technical background is sufficient for attack-defense tree acceptability
Nathan Daniel Schiele, Olga Gadyatskaya |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2023 | Comparative Evaluation of Bipartite, Node-Link, and Matrix-Based Network RepresentationsabstractThis work investigates and compares the performance of node-link diagrams, adjacency matrices, and bipartite layouts for visualizing networks. In a crowd-sourced user study ( n=150), we measure the task accuracy and completion time of the three representations for different network classes and properties. In contrast to the literature, which covers mostly topology-based tasks (e.g., path finding) in small datasets, we mainly focus on overview tasks for large and directed networks. We consider three overview tasks on networks with 500 nodes: (T1) network class identification, (T2) cluster detection, and (T3) network density estimation, and two detailed tasks: (T4) node in-degree vs. out-degree and (T5) representation mapping, on networks with 50 and 20 nodes, respectively. Our results show that bipartite layouts are beneficial for revealing the overall network structure, while adjacency matrices are most reliable across the different tasks. Moataz Abdelaal, Nathan Daniel Schiele, Katrin Angerbauer, Kuno Kurzhals, Michael Sedlmair, Daniel Weiskopf |
IEEE Trans. Vis. Comput. Graph. | 2 |
| 2021 | A Novel Approach for Attack Tree to Attack Graph Transformation
Nathan Daniel Schiele, Olga Gadyatskaya |
CRiSIS | 1 |