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Ruben Mechelinck

dblp:304/2693 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-7597-6222ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 87% Hardware security and side channels · 13%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › memory safety › memory isolation
in-process isolation
0.612022
You shall not (by)pass!: practical, secure, and fast PKU-based sandboxing · EuroSys 2022
Systems and software security
memory safety
0.612022
You shall not (by)pass!: practical, secure, and fast PKU-based sandboxing · EuroSys 2022
Hardware security and side channels › trusted execution environments
hardware isolation
0.212022
You shall not (by)pass!: practical, secure, and fast PKU-based sandboxing · EuroSys 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

memory protection keys · 0.6control-flow integrity · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 GlueZilla: Efficient and Scalable Software to Hardware Binding using Rowhammer
Ruben Mechelinck, Daniel Dorfmeister, Bernhard Fischer, Stijn Volckaert, Stefan Brunthaler 0001
DIMVA1
2022 You shall not (by)pass!: practical, secure, and fast PKU-based sandboxing
abstract
Memory Protection Keys for Userspace (PKU) is a recent hardware feature that allows programs to assign virtual memory pages to protection domains, and to change domain access permissions using inexpensive, unprivileged instructions. Several in-process memory isolation approaches leverage this feature to prevent untrusted code from accessing sensitive program state and data. Typically, PKU-based isolation schemes need to be used in conjunction with mitigations such as CFI because untrusted code, when compromised, can otherwise bypass the PKU access permissions using unprivileged instructions or operating system APIs.
Alexios Voulimeneas, Jonas Vinck, Ruben Mechelinck, Stijn Volckaert
EuroSys3