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John Qin

dblp:304/4320 · DBLP profile ↗
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4ranked-venue papers
0as first author
4since 2021 · last 2025
0000-0002-9450-8010ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 3 · 3 since 2021Theory of computation · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
4 papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
fair division
2.942025
Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores · STOC 2025
Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores · IJCAI 2024
New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores · IJCAI 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
envy-freeness
2.332025
Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores · STOC 2025
Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores · IJCAI 2024
New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores · IJCAI 2023
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
indivisible chores allocation
1.222023
New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores · IJCAI 2023
Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences · AAAI 2022
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division › envy-freeness
EFX allocation
0.912025
Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores · STOC 2025
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division
weighted fair division
0.812024
Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores · IJCAI 2024
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › fair division › envy-freeness
envy-freeness up to one good
0.612022
Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences · AAAI 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

polynomial-time algorithm · 0.7strongly polynomial-time algorithm · 0.6competitive equilibrium with equal incomes · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2025 Constant-Factor EFX Exists for Chores
Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
STOC3
2024 Weighted EF1 and PO Allocations with Few Types of Agents or Chores
Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
IJCAI3
2023 New Algorithms for the Fair and Efficient Allocation of Indivisible Chores
abstract
We study the problem of fairly and efficiently allocating indivisible chores among agents with additive disutility functions. We consider the widely used envy-based fairness properties of EF1 and EFX in conjunction with the efficiency property of fractional Pareto-optimality (fPO). Existence (and computation) of an allocation that is simultaneously EF1/EFX and fPO are challenging open problems, and we make progress on both of them. We show the existence of an allocation that is - EF1 + fPO, when there are three agents, - EF1 + fPO, when there are at most two disutility functions, - EFX + fPO, for three agents with bivalued disutility functions. These results are constructive, based on strongly polynomial-time algorithms. We also investigate non-existence and show that an allocation that is EFX+fPO need not exist, even for two agents.
Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
IJCAI3
2022 Fair and Efficient Allocations of Chores under Bivalued Preferences
abstract
We study the problem of fair and efficient allocation of a set of indivisible chores to agents with additive cost functions. We consider the popular fairness notion of envy-freeness up to one good (EF1) with the efficiency notion of Pareto-optimality (PO). While it is known that EF1+PO allocations exists and can be computed in pseudo-polynomial time in the case of goods, the same problem is open for chores. Our first result is a strongly polynomial-time algorithm for computing an EF1+PO allocation for bivalued instances, where agents have (at most) two disutility values for the chores. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first non-trivial class of chores to admit an EF1+PO allocation and an efficient algorithm for its computation. We also study the problem of computing an envy-free (EF) and PO allocation for the case of divisible chores. While the existence of EF+PO allocation is known via competitive equilibrium with equal incomes, its efficient computation is open. Our second result shows that for bivalued instances, an EF+PO allocation can be computed in strongly polynomial-time.
Jugal Garg, Aniket Murhekar, John Qin
AAAI3