We consider matroid allocation problems under \textit{opportunity fairness} constraints: resources need to be allocated to a set of agents under matroid constraints (which includes classical problems such as bipartite matching). Agents are divided into $C$ groups according to a sensitive attribute, and an allocation is opportunity-fair if each group receives the same share proportional to the maximum feasible allocation it could achieve in isolation. We study the Price of Fairness (PoF), i.e., the ratio between maximum size allocations and maximum size opportunity-fair allocations. We first provide a characterization of the PoF leveraging the underlying polymatroid structure of the allocation problem. Based on this characterization, we prove bounds on the PoF in various settings from fully adversarial (worst-case) to fully random. Notably, one of our main results considers an arbitrary matroid structure with agents randomly divided into groups. In this setting, we prove a PoF bound as a function of the (relative) size of the largest group. Our result implies that, as long as there is no dominant group (i.e., the largest group is not too large), opportunity fairness constraints do not induce any loss of social welfare (defined as the allocation size). Overall, our results give insights into which aspects of the problem's structure affect the trade-off between opportunity fairness and social welfare.

We initiate the study of how auction design affects the division of surplus among bidders. We propose a parsimonious measure for equity and apply it to standard auctions for homogeneous goods. Our surplus-equitable mechanism is efficient, Bayesian-Nash incentive compatible, and achieves surplus parity among winners ex-post. The uniform-price auction is equity-optimal if and only if bidders have a common value. Against intuition, the pay-as-bid auction is not always equity-preferred if bidders have private values. In auctions with price mixing between pay-as-bid and uniform prices, we provide prior-free bounds on the equity-preferred pricing under a common regularity condition on signals. The full paper is available at https://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07799.

We explore a prophet inequality problem, where the values of a sequence of items are drawn i.i.d. from some distribution, and an online decision maker must select one item irrevocably. We establish that CRℓ the worst-case competitive ratio between the expected optimal performance of an online decision maker compared to that of a prophet who uses the average of the top ℓ items is exactly the solution to an integral equation. This quantity CRℓ is larger than 1 — e -ℓ. This implies that the bound converges exponentially fast to 1 as ℓ grows. In particular for ℓ = 2, CR2 ≈ 0.966 which is much closer to 1 than the classical bound of 0.745 for ℓ = 1. Additionally, we prove asymptotic lower bounds for the competitive ratio of a more general scenario, where the decision maker is permitted to select k items. This subsumes the k multi-unit i.i.d. prophet problem and provides the current best asymptotic guarantees, as well as enables broader understanding in the more general framework. Finally, we prove a tight asymptotic competitive ratio when only static threshold policies are allowed.

We consider a Multi-Armed Bandit problem with covering constraints, where the primary goal is to ensure that each arm receives a minimum expected reward while maximizing the total cumulative reward. In this scenario, the optimal policy then belongs to some unknown feasible set. Unlike much of the existing literature, we do not assume the presence of a safe policy or a feasibility margin, which hinders the exclusive use of conservative approaches. Consequently, we propose and analyze an algorithm that switches between pessimism and optimism in the face of uncertainty. We prove both precise problem-dependent and problem-independent bounds, demonstrating that our algorithm achieves the best of the two approaches—depending on the presence or absence of a feasibility margin—in terms of constraint violation guarantees. Furthermore, our results indicate that playing greedily on the constraints actually outperforms pessimism when considering long-term violations rather than violations on a per-round basis.

We study single-machine scheduling of jobs, each belonging to a job type that determines its duration distribution. We start by analyzing the scenario where the type characteristics are known and then move to two learning scenarios where the types are unknown: non-preemptive problems, where each started job must be completed before moving to another job; and preemptive problems, where job execution can be paused in the favor of moving to a different job. In both cases, we design algorithms that achieve sublinear excess cost, compared to the performance with known types, and prove lower bounds for the non-preemptive case. Notably, we demonstrate, both theoretically and through simulations, how preemptive algorithms can greatly outperform non-preemptive ones when the durations of different job types are far from one another, a phenomenon that does not occur when the type durations are known.

We consider the problem of online allocation subject to a long-term fairness penalty. Contrary to existing works, however, we do not assume that the decision-maker observes the protected attributes---which is often unrealistic in practice. Instead they can purchase data that help estimate them from sources of different quality; and hence reduce the fairness penalty at some cost. We model this problem as a multi-armed bandit problem where each arm corresponds to the choice of a data source, coupled with the fair online allocation problem. We propose an algorithm that jointly solves both problems and show that it has a regret bounded by $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$. A key difficulty is that the rewards received by selecting a source are correlated by the fairness penalty, which leads to a need for randomization (despite a stochastic setting). Our algorithm takes into account contextual information available before the source selection, and can adapt to many different fairness notions.

Discrimination in machine learning often arises along multiple dimensions (a.k.a. protected attributes); it is then desirable to ensure \emph{intersectional fairness}---i.e., that no subgroup is discriminated against. It is known that ensuring \emph{marginal fairness} for every dimension independently is not sufficient in general. Due to the exponential number of subgroups, however, directly measuring intersectional fairness from data is impossible. In this paper, our primary goal is to understand in detail the relationship between marginal and intersectional fairness through statistical analysis. We first identify a set of sufficient conditions under which an exact relationship can be obtained. Then, we prove bounds (easily computable through marginal fairness and other meaningful statistical quantities) in high-probability on intersectional fairness in the general case. Beyond their descriptive value, we show that these theoretical bounds can be leveraged to derive a heuristic improving the approximation and bounds of intersectional fairness by choosing, in a relevant manner, protected attributes for which we describe intersectional subgroups. Finally, we test the performance of our approximations and bounds on real and synthetic data-sets.

Effectively designing and evaluating public health responses to the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic requires accurate estimation of the prevalence of COVID-19 across the United States (US). Equipment shortages and varying testing capabilities have however hindered the usefulness of the official reported positive COVID-19 case counts. We introduce four complementary approaches to estimate the cumulative incidence of symptomatic COVID-19 in each state in the US as well as Puerto Rico and the District of Columbia, using a combination of excess influenza-like illness reports, COVID-19 test statistics, COVID-19 mortality reports, and a spatially structured epidemic model. Instead of relying on the estimate from a single data source or method that may be biased, we provide multiple estimates, each relying on different assumptions and data sources. Across our four approaches emerges the consistent conclusion that on April 4, 2020, the estimated case count was 5 to 50 times higher than the official positive test counts across the different states. Nationally, our estimates of COVID-19 symptomatic cases as of April 4 have a likely range of 2.3 to 4.8 million, with possibly as many as 7.6 million cases, up to 25 times greater than the cumulative confirmed cases of about 311,000. Extending our methods to May 16, 2020, we estimate that cumulative symptomatic incidence ranges from 4.9 to 10.1 million, as opposed to 1.5 million positive test counts. The proposed combination of approaches may prove useful in assessing the burden of COVID-19 during resurgences in the US and other countries with comparable surveillance systems.