Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Chun-Yen Lee
dblp:312/9504
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
1as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0007-8184-4764ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network optimization and economics · 62% Edge and fog computing · 38% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 6, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Edge and fog computing
mobile edge computing |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge Computing · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2024 |
Network optimization and economics
resource allocation |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge Computing · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2024 |
Network security › attack resilience › attack mitigation › denial-of-service defense
DDoS defense |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge Computing · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2024 |
Network security › intrusion detection and prevention › intrusion detection
intrusion prevention system |
0.8 | 1 | 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge Computing · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2024 |
Network optimization and economics › resource allocation
game-theoretic resource allocation |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge Computing · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2024 |
Network optimization and economics › game theory › dynamic game
stackelberg equilibrium |
0.2 | 1 | 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge Computing · IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. 2024 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
stackelberg equilibrium · 1.5game theory · 1.5
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Joint Resource Allocation and Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Edge ComputingabstractDistributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack is critical to latency-critical systems such as Multi-Access Edge Computing (MEC) as it significantly increases the response delay of the victim service. An intrusion prevention system (IPS) is a promising solution to defend against such attacks. Still, there will be a trade-off between IPS deployment and application resource reservation as IPS deployment will reduce the computational resources for MEC applications. In this work, we propose a game-theoretic framework to study the joint computational resource allocation and IPS deployment in the MEC architecture. Given the expected attack strength and end-user demands, we study the pricing strategy of the MEC platform operator (MPO) and purchase strategy of the application service providers (ASPs). The best responses of both MPO and ASPs are derived theoretically. Based on the best responses, we propose an efficient algorithm to derive the Stackelberg equilibrium. The properties and optimality in the efficiency of the equilibrium are analyzed through simulations. The results confirm that the proposed solutions significantly increase the social welfare of the system. Chun-Yen Lee, Zhan-Lun Chang, Chih-Yu Wang 0001, Hung-Yu Wei 0001 |
IEEE Trans. Serv. Comput. | 1 |
| 2021 | Game-Theoretic Intrusion Prevention System Deployment for Mobile Edge ComputingabstractThe network attack such as Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attack could be critical to latency-critical systems such as Mobile Edge Computing (MEC) as such attacks significantly increase the response delay of the victim service. Intrusion prevention system (IPS) is a promising solution to defend against such attacks, but there will be a trade-off between IPS deployment and application resource reservation as the deployment of IPS will reduce the number of computation resources for MEC applications. In this paper, we proposed a game-theoretic framework to study the joint computation resource allocation and IPS deployment in the MEC architecture. We study the pricing strategy of the MEC platform operator and purchase strategy of the application service provider, given the expected attack strength and end user demands. The best responses of both MPO and ASPs are derived theoretically to identify the Stackelberg equilibrium. The simulation results confirm that the proposed solutions significantly increase the social welfare of the system. Zhan-Lun Chang, Chun-Yen Lee, Chih-Yu Wang 0001, Hung-Yu Wei 0001 |
GLOBECOM | 2 |