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Juxing Chen

dblp:315/7511 · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · conflict

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 2 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 50% Web and mobile security · 50%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Software testing · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.812024
URadar: Discovering Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities via Adaptive Dynamic Testing · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
Web and mobile security › web security
web vulnerability detection
0.812024
URadar: Discovering Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities via Adaptive Dynamic Testing · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024
Software testing
dynamic testing
0.812024
URadar: Discovering Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities via Adaptive Dynamic Testing · IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur. 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

mutation testing · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 SyzLego: Enhancing Kernel Directed Greybox Fuzzing via Dependency Inference and Scheduling
Chengxiang Liao, Juxing Chen, Zulie Pan
ISC (1)4
2024 URadar: Discovering Unrestricted File Upload Vulnerabilities via Adaptive Dynamic Testing
abstract
Unrestricted file upload (UFU) vulnerabilities, especially unrestricted executable file upload (UEFU) vulnerabilities, pose severe security risks to web servers. For instance, attackers can leverage such vulnerabilities to execute arbitrary code to gain the control of a whole web server. Therefore, it is significant to develop effective and efficient methods to detect UFU and UEFU vulnerabilities. Towards this, most state-of-the-art methods are designed based on dynamic testing. Nevertheless, they still entail two critical limitations. 1) They heavily rely on manual efforts, which are error-prone and have poor adaptability. 2) They seldom leverage effective information to guide the testing, resulting in generating a large number of invalid test cases. Such limitations severely hinder the performance of UFU vulnerability detection. In this paper, we propose URadar, an adaptive dynamic testing-based method for detecting UFU and UEFU vulnerabilities. There are three core designs in URadar, including file upload interface identification, file type restriction inference, and invalid mutation combination filtration, which can effectively solve the two limitations of existing methods. To evaluate the performance of URadar, we conduct extensive experiments and compare URadar with state-of-the-art methods (e.g., FUSE, RIPS). In testing 18 web applications, URadar discovers 26 UEFU vulnerabilities, where 8 are new, and 6 have been assigned new CVE/CNNVD IDs. By contrast, FUSE and RIPS find 14 and 2 UEFU vulnerabilities, respectively. To discover the same number of UFU vulnerabilities, FUSE needs to send 73,261 request packets with a time cost of 2,791.1s on average, 23.43 and 20.53 times of the requirements for URadar. The above results demonstrate that URadar significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art methods. In addition, we have open-sourced URadar to facilitate future research on UFU vulnerability detection.
Yuanchao Chen, Yuwei Li 0002, Zulie Pan, Yuliang Lu, Juxing Chen, Shouling Ji
IEEE Trans. Inf. Forensics Secur.5