The Domain Name System (DNS) plays a crucial role in modern web applications; however, manipulations such as hijacking, tampering, and censorship can disrupt domain resolution, posing significant privacy and security risks. While such manipulations are prevalent across global DNS infrastructures, their scope and mechanisms remain poorly understood. Existing studies focus on country-level censorship or rely on authoritative data and passive traffic from selected domains, which prevents a comprehensive understanding. Moreover, the dynamic nature of modern DNS resolution, in which a single domain may resolve to thousands of edge servers, further complicates the detection of manipulated responses.

There are over a million open DNS servers in the wild. However, not all servers perform recursive queries directly. Instead, many DNS forwarders forward queries to upstream recursive servers or other DNS forwarders for name resolving on their behalf. The groups of open servers that have such dependencies on each other form ODNS Clusters. The dependencies can result in vulnerabilities; yet we have little knowledge of the ODNS cluster structure. In this work, we measure the inter-dependence of open DNS resolvers and find that 1.9 million open DNS servers form only 81,636 ODNS clusters. We further analyze the characteristics of the clustered ODNS structure. The key observations include biased cluster size distribution, discrepancy of ODNS infrastructures among countries, concentration in major public DNS server providers, and potential security and resilience risks due to the dependence.