Imperceptibility is one of the crucial requirements for adversarial examples. Previous adversarial attacks on 3D point cloud recognition suffer from noticeable outliers, resulting in low imperceptibility. We think that the drawbacks can be alleviated via taking the local curvature of the point cloud into consideration. Existing approaches introduce the local geometry distance into the attack objective function. However, their definition of the local geometry distance neglects different perceptibility of distortions along different directions. In this paper, we aim to enhance the imperceptibility of adversarial attacks on 3D point cloud recognition by better preserving the local curvature of the original 3D point clouds. To this end, we propose the Curvature-Invariant Method (CIM), which directly regularizes the back-propagated gradient during the generation of adversarial point clouds based on two assumptions. Specifically, we first decompose the back-propagated gradients into the tangent plane and the normal direction. Then we directly reduce the gradient along the large curvature direction on the tangent plane and only keep the gradient along the negative normal direction. Comprehensive experimental comparisons confirm the superiority of our approach. Notably, our strategy can achieve 7.2% and 14.5% improvements in Hausdorff distance and Gaussian curvature measurements of the imperceptibility.

With the great achievement of vision transformers (ViTs), transformer-based approaches have become the new paradigm for solving various computer vision tasks. However, recent research shows that similar to convolutional neural networks (CNNs), ViTs are still vulnerable to adversarial attacks. To explore the shared deficiency of models with different structures, researchers begin to analyze the cross-structure adversarial transferability, which is still under-explored. Therefore, in this work, we focus on the ViT attacks to improve the cross-structure transferability between the transformer-based and convolution-based models. Previous studies fail to thoroughly investigate the influence of the components inside the ViT models on adversarial transferability, leading to inferior performance. To overcome the drawback, we launch a motivating study by linearly down-scaling the gradients of components inside the ViT models to analyze their influence on adversarial transferability. Based on the motivating study, we find that the gradient of the skip connection most influences transferability and believe that back-propagating gradients from deeper blocks can enhance transferability. Therefore, we propose the Virtual Dense Connection method (VDC). Specifically, without changing the forward pass, we first recompose the original network to add virtual dense connections. Then we back-propagate gradients of deeper Attention maps and Multi-layer Perceptron (MLP) blocks via virtual dense connections when generating adversarial samples. Extensive experiments confirm the superiority of our proposed method over the state-of-the-art baselines, with an 8.2% improvement in transferability between ViT models and a 7.2% improvement in cross-structure transferability from ViTs to CNNs.

Vision transformers (ViTs) have been successfully deployed in a variety of computer vision tasks, but they are still vulnerable to adversarial samples. Transfer-based attacks use a local model to generate adversarial samples and directly transfer them to attack a target black-box model. The high efficiency of transfer-based attacks makes it a severe security threat to ViT-based applications. Therefore, it is vital to design effective transfer-based attacks to identify the deficiencies of ViTs beforehand in security-sensitive scenarios. Existing efforts generally focus on regularizing the input gradients to stabilize the updated direction of adversarial samples. However, the variance of the back-propagated gradients in intermediate blocks of ViTs may still be large, which may make the generated adversarial samples focus on some model-specific features and get stuck in poor local optima. To overcome the shortcomings of existing approaches, we propose the Token Gradient Regularization (TGR) method. According to the structural characteristics of ViTs, TGR reduces the variance of the back-propagated gradient in each internal block of ViTs in a token-wise manner and utilizes the regularized gradient to generate adversarial samples. Extensive experiments on attacking both ViTs and CNNs confirm the superiority of our approach. Notably, compared to the state-of-the-art transfer-based at-tacks, our TGR offers a performance improvement of 8.8% on average.

The exponential growth of social media platforms such as Twitter and Facebook has revolutionized textual communication and textual content publication in human society. However, they have been increasingly exploited to propagate toxic content, such as hate speech, malicious advertisement, and pornography, which can lead to highly negative impacts (e.g., harmful effects on teen mental health). Researchers and practitioners have been enthusiastically developing and extensively deploying textual content moderation software to address this problem. However, we find that malicious users can evade moderation by changing only a few words in the toxic content. Moreover, modern content moderation software's performance against malicious inputs remains underexplored. To this end, we propose MTTM, a Metamorphic Testing framework for Textual content Moderation software. Specifically, we conduct a pilot study on 2, 000 text messages collected from real users and summarize eleven metamorphic relations across three perturbation levels: character, word, and sentence. MTTM employs these metamorphic relations on toxic textual contents to generate test cases, which are still toxic yet likely to evade moderation. In our evaluation, we employ MTTM to test three commercial textual content moderation software and two state-of-the-art moderation algorithms against three kinds of toxic content. The results show that MTTM achieves up to 83.9%, 51%, and 82.5% error finding rates (EFR) when testing commercial moderation software provided by Google, Baidu, and Huawei, respectively, and it obtains up to 91.2% EFR when testing the state-of-the-art algorithms from the academy. In addition, we leverage the test cases generated by MTTM to retrain the model we explored, which largely improves model robustness 0% ~ 5.9% EFR) while maintaining the accuracy on the original test set. A demo can be found in this link1.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. It is thus imperative to devise effective attack algorithms to identify the deficiencies of DNNs beforehand in security-sensitive applications. To efficiently tackle the black-box setting where the target model's particulars are unknown, feature-level transfer-based attacks propose to contaminate the intermediate feature outputs of local models, and then directly employ the crafted adversarial samples to attack the target model. Due to the transferability of features, feature-level attacks have shown promise in synthesizing more transferable adversarial samples. However, existing feature-level attacks generally employ inaccurate neuron importance estimations, which deteriorates their transferability. To overcome such pitfalls, in this paper, we propose the Neuron Attribution-based Attack (NAA), which conducts feature-level attacks with more accurate neuron importance estimations. Specifically, we first completely attribute a model's output to each neuron in a middle layer. We then derive an approximation scheme of neuron attribution to tremendously reduce the computation overhead. Finally, we weight neurons based on their attribution results and launch feature-level attacks. Extensive experiments confirm the superiority of our approach to the state-of-the-art benchmarks. Our code is available at: hups.//rgithub.com/jprhang1810/NAA.