VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Minzhou Pan
dblp:318/1220
· DBLP profile ↗
8ranked-venue papers
2as first author
8since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0001-5925-7535ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 5 · 1 first-author · 5 since 2021Security and privacy · 3 · 1 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | AIR-BENCH 2024: A Safety Benchmark based on Regulation and Policies Specified Risk CategoriesabstractFoundation models (FMs) provide societal benefits but also amplify risks. Governments, companies, and researchers have proposed regulatory frameworks, acceptable use policies, and safety benchmarks in response. However, existing public benchmarks often define safety categories based on previous literature, intuitions, or common sense, leading to disjointed sets of categories for risks specified in recent regulations and policies, which makes it challenging to evaluate and compare FMs across these benchmarks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AIR-BENCH 2024, the first AI safety benchmark aligned with emerging government regulations and company policies, following the regulation-based safety categories grounded in the AI Risks taxonomy, AIR 2024. AIR 2024 decomposes 8 government regulations and 16 company policies into a four-tiered safety taxonomy with 314 granular risk categories in the lowest tier. AIR-BENCH 2024 contains 5,694 diverse prompts spanning these categories, with manual curation and human auditing to ensure quality. We evaluate leading language models on AIR-BENCH 2024 uncovering insights into their alignment with specified safety concerns. By bridging the gap between public benchmarks and practical AI risks, AIR-BENCH 2024 provides a foundation for assessing model safety across jurisdictions, fostering the development of safer and more responsible AI systems. Yi Zeng 0005, Yu Yang 0007, Andy Zhou, Jeffrey Ziwei Tan, Yuheng Tu 0001, Yifan Mai 0001, Kevin Klyman, Minzhou Pan, Ruoxi Jia 0001, Dawn Song, Percy Liang, Bo Li 0026 |
ICLR | 8 |
| 2025 | SafeWatch: An Efficient Safety-Policy Following Video Guardrail Model with Transparent ExplanationsabstractWith the rise of generative AI and rapid growth of high-quality video generation, video guardrails have become more crucial than ever to ensure safety and security across platforms. Current video guardrails, however, are either overly simplistic, relying on pure classification models trained on simple policies with limited unsafe categories, which lack detailed explanations, or prompting multimodal large language models (MLLMs) with long safety guidelines, which are inefficient and impractical for guardrailing real-world content. To bridge this gap, we propose SafeWatch, an efficient MLLM-based video guardrail model designed to follow customized safety policies and provide multi-label video guardrail outputs with content-specific explanations in a zero-shot manner. In particular, unlike traditional MLLM-based guardrails that encode all safety policies autoregressively, causing inefficiency and bias, SafeWatch uniquely encodes each policy chunk in parallel and eliminates their position bias such that all policies are attended simultaneously with equal importance. In addition, to improve efficiency and accuracy, SafeWatch incorporates a policy-aware visual token pruning algorithm that adaptively selects the most relevant video tokens for each policy, discarding noisy or irrelevant information. This allows for more focused, policy-compliant guardrail with significantly reduced computational overhead. Considering the limitations of existing video guardrail benchmarks, we propose SafeWatch-Bench, a large-scale video guardrail benchmark comprising over 2M videos spanning six safety categories which covers over 30 tasks to ensure a comprehensive coverage of all potential safety scenarios. We have conducted extensive experiments, showing that SafeWatch outperforms all SOTA video guardrails on SafeWatch-Bench by 28.2%, and achieves a 13.6% improvement on existing benchmarks, all while reducing inference costs by an average of 10%. SafeWatch also demonstrates strong policy-following abilities and outperforms previous SOTAs by 5.6% and 15.6% in zero-shot generalizability to new policies and new prompting tasks. Additionally, both LLM-as-a-judge and human evaluators confirm the high quality of the explanations provided by SafeWatch. Our project is open-sourced at https://safewatch-aiguard.github.io. Zhaorun Chen, Francesco Pinto, Minzhou Pan, Bo Li 0026 |
ICLR | 3 |
| 2025 | How to Evaluate and Mitigate IP Infringement in Visual Generative AI?abstractThe popularity of visual generative AI models like DALL-E 3, Stable Diffusion XL, Stable Video Diffusion, and Sora has been increasing. Through extensive evaluation, we discovered that the state-of-the-art visual generative models can generate content that bears a striking resemblance to characters protected by intellectual property rights held by major entertainment companies (such as Sony, Marvel, and Nintendo), which raises potential legal concerns. This happens when the input prompt contains the character’s name or even just descriptive details about their characteristics. To mitigate such IP infringement problems, we also propose a defense method against it. In detail, we develop a revised generation paradigm that can identify potentially infringing generated content and prevent IP infringement by utilizing guidance techniques during the diffusion process. It has the capability to recognize generated content that may be infringing on intellectual property rights, and mitigate such infringement by employing guidance methods throughout the diffusion process without retrain or fine-tune the pretrained models. Experiments on well-known character IPs like Spider-Man, Iron Man, and Superman demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed defense method. Zhenting Wang, Chen Chen 0043, Vikash Sehwag, Minzhou Pan, Lingjuan Lyu |
ICML | 4 |
| 2025 | PolyGuard: Massive Multi-Domain Safety Policy-Grounded Guardrail DatasetabstractAs large language models (LLMs) become widespread across diverse applications, concerns about the security and safety of LLM interactions have intensified. Numerous guardrail models and benchmarks have been developed to ensure LLM content safety. However, existing guardrail benchmarks are often built upon ad hoc risk taxonomies that lack a principled grounding in standardized safety policies, limiting their alignment with real-world operational requirements. Moreover, they tend to overlook domain-specific risks, while the same risk category can carry different implications across different domains. To bridge these gaps, we introduce PolyGuard, the first massive multi-domain safety policy-grounded guardrail dataset. PolyGuard offers: (1) broad domain coverage across eight safety-critical domains, such as finance, law, and codeGen; (2) policy-grounded risk construction based on authentic, domain-specific safety guidelines; (3) diverse interaction formats, encompassing declarative statements, questions, instructions, and multi-turn conversations; (4) advanced benign data curation via detoxification prompting to challenge over-refusal behaviors; and (5) \textbf{attack-enhanced instances} that simulate adversarial inputs designed to bypass guardrails. Based on PolyGuard, we benchmark 19 advanced guardrail models and uncover a series of findings, such as: (1) All models achieve varied F1 scores, with many demonstrating high variance across risk categories, highlighting their limited domain coverage and insufficient handling of domain-specific safety concerns; (2) As models evolve, their coverage of safety risks broadens, but performance on common risk categories may decrease; (3) All models remain vulnerable to optimized adversarial attacks. The policy-grounded \dataset establishes the first principled and comprehensive guardrail benchmark. We believe that \dataset and the unique insights derived from our evaluations will advance the development of policy-aligned and resilient guardrail systems. Mintong Kang, Zhaorun Chen, Chejian Xu, Jiawei Zhang 0013, Chengquan Guo, Minzhou Pan, Ivan Revilla, Bo Li 0026 |
NeurIPS | 6 |
| 2024 | Finding Needles in a Haystack: A Black-Box Approach to Invisible Watermark Detection
Minzhou Pan, Zhenting Wang, Xin Dong 0009, Vikash Sehwag, Lingjuan Lyu, Xue Lin 0001 |
ECCV (33) | 1 |
| 2023 | Narcissus: A Practical Clean-Label Backdoor Attack with Limited InformationabstractBackdoor attacks introduce manipulated data into a machine learning model's training set, causing the model to misclassify inputs with a trigger during testing to achieve a desired outcome by the attacker. For backdoor attacks to bypass human inspection, it is essential that the injected data appear to be correctly labeled. The attacks with such property are often referred to as "clean-label attacks." The success of current clean-label backdoor methods largely depends on access to the complete training set. Yet, accessing the complete dataset is often challenging or unfeasible since it frequently comes from varied, independent sources, like images from distinct users. It remains a question of whether backdoor attacks still present real threats. Yi Zeng 0005, Minzhou Pan, Hoang Anh Just, Lingjuan Lyu, Meikang Qiu, Ruoxi Jia 0001 |
CCS | 2 |
| 2023 | ASSET: Robust Backdoor Data Detection Across a Multiplicity of Deep Learning Paradigms
Minzhou Pan, Yi Zeng 0005, Lingjuan Lyu, Xue Lin 0001, Ruoxi Jia 0001 |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2023 | Meta-Sift: How to Sift Out a Clean Subset in the Presence of Data Poisoning?
Yi Zeng 0005, Minzhou Pan, Himanshu Jahagirdar, Ming Jin 0002, Lingjuan Lyu, Ruoxi Jia 0001 |
USENIX Security Symposium | 2 |