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Patrick Zuest

dblp:319/4197 · also Patrick Züst · DBLP profile ↗
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 87% Usable security · 13%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › decentralized finance
decentralized finance security
0.612022
Impact and User Perception of Sandwich Attacks in the DeFi Ecosystem · CHI 2022
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › maximal extractable value
sandwich attack
0.612022
Impact and User Perception of Sandwich Attacks in the DeFi Ecosystem · CHI 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

mixed-method study · 0.6interviews · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 Dissecting the EIP-2930 Optional Access Lists
Lioba Heimbach, Quentin Kniep, Yann Vonlanthen, Roger Wattenhofer, Patrick Zuest
FC (1)5
2022 Impact and User Perception of Sandwich Attacks in the DeFi Ecosystem
abstract
Decentralized finance (DeFi) enables crypto-asset holders to conduct complex financial transactions, while maintaining control over their assets in the blockchain ecosystem. However, the transparency of blockchain networks and the open mechanism of DeFi applications also cause new security issues. In this paper, we focus on sandwich attacks, where attackers take advantage of the transaction confirmation delay and cause financial losses for victims. We evaluate the impact and investigate users’ perceptions of sandwich attacks through a mix-method study. We find that due to users’ lack of technical background and insufficient notifications from the markets, many users were not aware of the existence and the impact of sandwich attacks. They also had a limited understanding of how to resolve the security issue. Interestingly, users showed high tolerance for the impact of sandwich attacks on individuals and the ecosystem, despite potential financial losses. We discuss general implications for users, DeFi applications, and the community.
Kanye Ye Wang, Patrick Zuest, Yaxing Yao, Zhicong Lu, Roger Wattenhofer
CHI2