Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
David A. Ramos
dblp:32/1943
· DBLP profile ↗
4ranked-venue papers
3as first author
0since 2021 · last 2016
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Systems, architecture and hardware · 2 · 1 first-authorSecurity and privacy · 1 · 1 first-authorSoftware engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-authorTheory of computation · 1 · 1 first-author
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
4 papers |
Program analysis · 86% Program verification · 11% Compilers and program optimization · 3% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 100% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Program analysis
symbolic execution |
0.5 | 2 | 2016 | Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution: Correctness Checking for Real Code · USENIX ATC 2016 Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution: Correctness Checking for Real Code · USENIX Security Symposium 2015 |
Program analysis › symbolic execution
under-constrained symbolic execution |
0.5 | 2 | 2016 | Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution: Correctness Checking for Real Code · USENIX ATC 2016 Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution: Correctness Checking for Real Code · USENIX Security Symposium 2015 |
Program verification
equivalence checking |
0.1 | 1 | 2011 | Practical, Low-Effort Equivalence Verification of Real Code · CAV 2011 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › smart contract security
vulnerability detection |
0.1 | 1 | 2008 | Testudo: Heavyweight security analysis via statistical sampling · MICRO 2008 |
Compilers and program optimization
compiler correctness |
0.0 | 1 | 2011 | Practical, Low-Effort Equivalence Verification of Real Code · CAV 2011 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
symbolic execution · 0.3tagged memory · 0.2statistical sampling · 0.2distributed debugging · 0.2equivalence checking · 0.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016 | Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution: Correctness Checking for Real Code
David A. Ramos, Dawson R. Engler |
USENIX ATC | 1 |
| 2015 | Under-Constrained Symbolic Execution: Correctness Checking for Real Code
David A. Ramos, Dawson R. Engler |
USENIX Security Symposium | 1 |
| 2011 | Practical, Low-Effort Equivalence Verification of Real Code
David A. Ramos, Dawson R. Engler |
CAV | 1 |
| 2008 | Testudo: Heavyweight security analysis via statistical samplingabstractHeavyweight security analysis systems, such as taint analysis and dynamic type checking, are powerful technologies used to detect security vulnerabilities and software bugs. Traditional software implementations of these systems have high instrumentation overhead and suffer from significant performance impacts. To mitigate these slowdowns, a few hardware-assisted techniques have been recently proposed. However, these solutions incur a large memory overhead and require hardware platform support in the form of tagged memory systems and extended bus designs. Due to these costs and limitations, the deployment of heavyweight security analysis solutions is, as of today, limited to the research lab. In this paper, we describe Testudo, a novel hardware approach to heavyweight security analysis that is based on statistical sampling of a programpsilas dataflow. Our dynamic distributed debugging reduces the memory overhead to a small storage space by selectively sampling only a few tagged variables to analyze during any particular execution of the program. Our system requires only small hardware modifications: it adds a small sample cache to the main processor and extends the pipeline registers to propagate analysis tags. To gain high analysis coverage, we rely on a population of users to run the program, sampling a different random set of variables during each new run. We show that we can achieve high coverage analysis at virtually no performance impact, even with a reasonably-sized population of users. In addition, our approach even scales to heavyweight debugging techniques by keeping per-user runtime overheads low despite performing traditionally costly analyses. Moreover, the low hardware cost of our implementation allows it to be easily distributed across large user populations, leading to a higher level of security analysis coverage than previously. Joseph L. Greathouse, Ilya Wagner, David A. Ramos, Gautam Bhatnagar, Todd M. Austin, Valeria Bertacco, Seth Pettie |
MICRO | 3 |