Modern applications can be easily developed and operated by discovering and consuming cloud services that provide the desired functionality. We observe the emergence of ‘Service ecosystems’, i.e. combinations of services which are offered by different providers and which interoperate seamlessly behind the curtains to build applications generating added value compared with single components. However, security and trustworthiness concerns constitute an obstacle for uptake, as trust relations that were in place in traditional component acquisition and operation phases cannot be established in the same forms due to the high number of service providers available and shorter time-to-market requirements. This paper presents our view about how security certification could address these issues, going beyond existing schemes, which mostly address static systems and environments. We show how the combination of recent innovations can lead to the introduction of new security certification schemes that adapt to service-based ecosystems. Such schemes are based on explicit representation of service security features, their machine readability, and an advanced processing and composition support. We present a security-aware service marketplace, allowing consumers to build secure business applications through advanced search and discovery capabilities that consider functional requirements together with certified security features.

This panel will address the following question. Does an increase in the granularity of access control systems produce a measurable reduction in risk and help meet the goals of the organization, or is the cost prohibitively high?

Cloud and IT service providers should act as responsible stewards for the data of their customers and users. However, the current absence of accountability frameworks for distributed IT services makes it difficult for users to understand, influence and determine how their service providers honour their obligations. The A4Cloud project will create solutions to support users in deciding and tracking how their data is used by cloud service providers. By combining methods of risk analysis, policy enforcement, monitoring and compliance auditing with tailored IT mechanisms for security, assurance and redress, A4Cloud aims to extend accountability across entire cloud service value chains, covering personal and business sensitive information in the cloud.

As computing technology becomes increasingly pervasive and interconnected, mobility leads to shorter-lasting relationships between end-points with many different security requirements. Also the rapid development of new service landscapes calls for standardized, yet highly flexible security protocols. It has been demonstrated that the increasing number of application contexts of these highly flexible security protocols opens vulnerabilities emerging from the difficulty of assessing the impact of the selected protocol options on the actual security of the relationship established using the protocol. This contribution clearly identifies the underlying problem more generally and establishes the need for run-time on-the-fly verification of security protocol instances considering the actual choice of options and environment assumptions. Extending security protocol verification from the design-time realm into deployment and even run-time generates various challenges. This paper identifies these new challenges and proposes directions for research on solutions.

Demonstrating the safety of a system (ie. avoiding the undesired propagation of access rights or indirect access through some other granted resource) is one of the goals of access control research, e.g. [1-4]. However, the flexibility required from enterprise resource management (ERP) systems may require the implementation of seemingly contradictory requirements (e.g. tight access control but at the same time support for discretionary delegation of workflow tasks and rights).To aid in the analysis of safety problems in workflow-based ERP system, this paper presents a model-checking based approach for automated analysis of delegation and revocation functionalities. This is done in the context of a real-world banking workflow requiring static and dynamic separation of duty properties.We derived information about the workflow from BPEL specifications and ERP business object repositories. This was captured in a SMV specification together with a definition of possible delegation and revocation scenarios. The required separation properties were translated into a set of LTL-based constraints. In particular, we analyse the interaction between delegation and revocation activities in the context of dynamic separation of duty policies.

The paper introduces a formal security model for a microprocessor hardware system. The model has been developed as part of the evaluation process of the processor product according to ITSEC assurance level E4. Novel aspects of the model are the need for defining integrity and confidentiality objectives on the hardware level without the operating system or application specification and security policy being given, and the utilization of an abstract function and data space. The security model consists of a system model given as a state transition automaton on infinite structures and the formalization of security objectives by means of properties of automaton behaviors. Validity of the security properties is proved. The paper compares the model with published ones and summarizes the lessons learned throughout the modeling process.

We introduce a new method for the formal development of secure systems that closely corresponds to the way secure systems are developed in practice. It is based on FOCUS, a general-purpose approach to the design and verification of distributed, inter