VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Luke Harrison
dblp:320/8475
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0000-0002-2130-0470ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Camel: E2E Verifiable Instant Runoff Voting without Tallying AuthoritiesabstractInstant Runoff Voting (IRV) is one example of ranked-choice voting. It provides many known benefits when used in elections, such as minimising vote splitting, ensuring few votes are wasted, and providing resistance to strategic voting. However, the voting and tallying procedures for IRV are much more complicated than those of plurality and are both error-prone and tedious. Many automated systems have been proposed to simplify these procedures in IRV. Some of these also employ cryptographic techniques to protect the secrecy of ballots and enable verification of the tally. Nearly all of these cryptographic systems require a set of trustworthy tallying authorities (TAs) to perform the decryption of votes and/or running of mix servers, which adds significant complexity to the implementation and election management. We address this issue by proposing Camel: an E2E verifiable solution for IRV that requires no TAs. Camel employs a novel representation and a universally verifiable shifting procedure for ballots that facilitate the elimination of candidates as required in an IRV election. We combine these with a homomorphic encryption scheme and zero-knowledge proofs to protect the secrecy of the ballots and enable any party to verify the well-formedness of the ballots and the correctness of the tally in an IRV election. We examine the security of Camel and prove it maintains ballot secrecy by limiting the learned information (namely the tally) against a set of colluding voters. Luke Harrison, Samiran Bag, Feng Hao 0001 |
AsiaCCS | 1 |
| 2024 | On the feasibility of E2E verifiable online voting - A case study from Durga Puja trialabstractIndia is the largest democracy by population and has one of the largest deployments of e-voting in the world for national elections. However, the e-voting machines used in India are not end-to-end (E2E) verifiable. The inability to verify the tallying integrity of an election by the public leaves the outcome open to disputes. E2E verifiable e-voting systems are commonly regarded as the most promising solution to address this problem, but they had not been implemented or trialed in India. It was unclear whether such systems would be usable and practical to the Indian people. Previous works such as Helios require a set of tallying authorities (TAs) to perform the decryption and tallying operations, but finding and managing TAs can prove difficult. This paper presents a TA-free E2E verifiable online voting system based on the DRE-ip protocol. In collaboration with the local authority of New Town, Kolkata, India, we conducted an online voting trial as part of the 2022 Durga Puja festival celebration, during which residents of New Town were invited to use mobile phones to vote for their favorite pujas (festival decorations) in an E2E verifiable manner. 543 participants attended the Durga Puja trial and 95 of them provided feedback by filling in an anonymous survey after voting. Based on the voter feedback, participants generally found the system easy to use. This was the first time that an E2E online voting system had been built and tested in India, suggesting its feasibility for non-statutory voting scenarios. Horia Druliac, Matthew Bardsley, Chris Riches, Christian Dunn, Luke Harrison, Bimal K. Roy, Feng Hao 0001 |
J. Inf. Secur. Appl. | 5 |
| 2022 | VERICONDOR: End-to-End Verifiable Condorcet Voting without Tallying AuthoritiesabstractCondorcet voting, first proposed by Marquis de Condorcet in the 18th century, chooses a winner of an election as one that defeats every other candidate by a simple majority. According to Condorcet's criterion, a Condorcet winner is the socially optimal choice in a multi-candidate election. However, despite the crucial importance of this voting system in social-choice theory, it has not been widely used in practical applications. This is partly due to the complex tallying procedure, and also the fact that several candidates may form a tie. Existing systems that provide online Condorcet voting services in the real world try to speed up the tallying process by collecting and tallying Condorcet ballots in a digital form. However, they require voters to completely trust the server. In this paper, we propose VERICONDO, the first end-to-end verifiable Condorcet e-voting system without any tallying authorities. Our system allows a voter to fully verify the tallying integrity without involving any trustworthy tallying authorities and provides strong protection of the ballot secrecy. One main challenge in our work lies in proving the well-formedness of an encrypted ballot while being able to tally the ballots in a publicly verifiable yet privacy-preserving manner. We overcome this challenge by adopting a pairwise comparison matrix and applying a novel vector-sum technique to achieve exceptional efficiency. The overall computational cost per ballot is O (n2) where n is the number of candidates. This is probably the best that one may hope for given the use of a n x n matrix to record a Condorcet ballot. In case of a tie, we show how to apply known Condorcet methods to break the tie in a publicly verifiable manner. Finally, we present a prototype implementation and benchmark performance to show the feasibility of our system. Luke Harrison, Samiran Bag, Hang Luo 0001, Feng Hao 0001 |
AsiaCCS | 1 |