Jay Lang

dblp:321/4435 · DBLP profile ↗
← Back
3ranked-venue papers
0as first author
3since 2021 · last 2023
0009-0005-7928-0002ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Computer networks · 2 · 2 since 2021Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers
Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures · 80% Energy-efficient computing · 20%
Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 67% Hardware security and side channels · 33%
Artificial intelligence
2 papers
Deep learning architectures and training · 100%

Topics — the 6 heaviest of 7, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Hardware accelerators and domain-specific architectures › network accelerator
SmartNIC
1.322023
Lightning: A Reconfigurable Photonic-Electronic SmartNIC for Fast and Energy-Efficient Inference · SIGCOMM 2023
Demo: First Demonstration of Real-Time Photonic-Electronic DNN Acceleration on SmartNICs · SIGCOMM 2023
Energy-efficient computing › energy-efficient machine learning
energy-efficient inference
0.712023
Lightning: A Reconfigurable Photonic-Electronic SmartNIC for Fast and Energy-Efficient Inference · SIGCOMM 2023
Systems and software security › exploitation
control-flow hijacking
0.612022
PACMAN: attacking ARM pointer authentication with speculative execution · ISCA 2022
Systems and software security › memory safety
memory corruption
0.612022
PACMAN: attacking ARM pointer authentication with speculative execution · ISCA 2022
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks › transient execution attack
speculative execution attack
0.612022
PACMAN: attacking ARM pointer authentication with speculative execution · ISCA 2022
Machine learning › Deep learning architectures and training › neural network inference
DNN inference
0.422023
Lightning: A Reconfigurable Photonic-Electronic SmartNIC for Fast and Energy-Efficient Inference · SIGCOMM 2023
Demo: First Demonstration of Real-Time Photonic-Electronic DNN Acceleration on SmartNICs · SIGCOMM 2023

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

photonic multiply-accumulate · 2.6count-action abstraction · 2.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2023 Demo: First Demonstration of Real-Time Photonic-Electronic DNN Acceleration on SmartNICs
abstract
We demonstrate Lightning, a reconfigurable photonic-electronic deep learning smartNIC that serves real-time inference requests at 4.055 GHz compute frequency. To do so, Lightning uses a novel datapath to feed traffic from the NIC into its photonic computing cores without incurring digital data movement bottlenecks. Lightning achieves this by employing a reconfigurable count-action abstraction, which decouples the compute control plane from the data plane. The count-action abstraction counts the number of operations for each computation task in the Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG). It then triggers the execution of the next task(s) as soon as the previous task is finished without interrupting the dataflow. Our prototype shows that Lightning achieves 99.25% photonic MAC accuracy. When serving real-time inference requests, Lightning accelerates the end-to-end inference latency of the LeNet DNN by 9.4× and 6.6× compared to Nvidia P4 and A100 GPUs, respectively.
Zhizhen Zhong, Mingran Yang, Jay Lang, Dirk R. Englund, Manya Ghobadi
SIGCOMM3
2023 Lightning: A Reconfigurable Photonic-Electronic SmartNIC for Fast and Energy-Efficient Inference
abstract
The massive growth of machine learning-based applications and the end of Moore's law have created a pressing need to redesign computing platforms. We propose Lightning, the first reconfigurable photonic-electronic smartNIC to serve real-time deep neural network inference requests. Lightning uses a fast datapath to feed traffic from the NIC into the photonic domain without creating digital packet processing and data movement bottlenecks. To do so, Lightning leverages a novel reconfigurable count-action abstraction that keeps track of the required computation operations of each inference packet. Our count-action abstraction decouples the compute control plane from the data plane by counting the number of operations in each task and triggers the execution of the next task(s) without interrupting the dataflow. We evaluate Lightning's performance using four platforms: a prototype, chip synthesis, emulations, and simulations. Our prototype demonstrates the feasibility of performing 8-bit photonic multiply-accumulate operations with 99.25% accuracy. To the best of our knowledge, our prototype is the highest-frequency photonic computing system, capable of serving real-time inference queries at 4.055 GHz end-to-end. Our simulations with large DNN models show that compared to Nvidia A100 GPU, A100X DPU, and Brainwave smartNIC, Lightning accelerates the average inference serve time by 337×, 329×, and 42×, while consuming 352×, 419×, and 54× less energy, respectively.
Zhizhen Zhong, Mingran Yang, Jay Lang, Christian Williams, Liam Kronman, Alex Sludds, Homa Esfahanizadeh, Dirk R. Englund, Manya Ghobadi
SIGCOMM3
2022 PACMAN: attacking ARM pointer authentication with speculative execution
abstract
This paper studies the synergies between memory corruption vulnerabilities and speculative execution vulnerabilities. We leverage speculative execution attacks to bypass an important memory protection mechanism, ARM Pointer Authentication, a security feature that is used to enforce pointer integrity. We present PACMAN, a novel attack methodology that speculatively leaks PAC verification results via micro-architectural side channels without causing any crashes. Our attack removes the primary barrier to conducting control-flow hijacking attacks on a platform protected using Pointer Authentication.
Joseph Ravichandran, Weon Taek Na, Jay Lang, Mengjia Yan 0001
ISCA3