Binary Neural Networks (BNNs) have obtained a strong foothold in the field of machine learning at the edge due to their minimal hardware requirements. However, their energy and performance efficiency remain hindered by frequent data transfer between memory and processors. Computation-in-memory (CIM) architectures address this problem by embedding processing units within the memory. Unfortunately, current implementations of CIM are susceptible to IP piracy attacks through side channels. This paper presents a novel secure periphery scheme for NN accelerators with sequential accumulation that conceals IP information by obscuring the power consumption of the counter responsible for the leakage. This is achieved by combining two innovative techniques: operand schedule randomization and an always-count Gray code counter. The results demonstrate that the proposed design effectively resists power side channel attacks (SCAs). Moreover, Signal-to-Noise Ratio (SNR) and Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA) show safe leakage levels. Compared to the state-of-the-art, our countermeasure reduces area and power overheads by up to 12.7× and 13.3×, achieving only 37% area and 51.2% power overhead with the added protection logic. Notably, this enhanced security comes with zero latency overhead, maintaining the performance of the baseline design.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has had a profound impact on our contemporary society, and it is indisputable that it will continue to play a significant role in the future. To further enhance AI experience and performance, a transition from large-scale server applications towards AI-powered edge devices is inevitable. In fact, current projections indicate that the market for Smart Edge Processors (SEPs) will grow beyond 70 Billion USD by 2026 [1]. Such a shift comes with major challenges, as these devices have limited computing and energy resources yet need to be highly performant. Additionally, security mechanisms need to be implemented to protect against diverse attack vectors as attackers now have physical access to the device. Besides cryptographic keys, Intellectual Property (IP), including neural network weights, may also be potential targets. The CONVOLVE [2] project (currently in its intermediate stage) follows a holistic approach to address these challenges and establish the EU in a leading position in embedded, ultra-low-power and secure processors for edge computing. It encompasses novel hardware technologies, end-to-end integrated workflows, and a security-by-design approach. This paper highlights the security aspects of future edge-AI processors by illustrating challenges encountered in CONVOLVE, the solutions we pursue including some early results, and directions for future research.

Computation-in-Memory (CIM) architectures present a promising solution for efficient implementation of Neural Networks. Particularly, SRAM-based digital CIM architectures are optimal candidates to realize them. Recent studies have revealed potential weaknesses in these architectures, particularly against power attacks. This study introduces a novel attack method enabling weight extraction through the analysis of the adder tree component within the architecture. In our attack, the k-means clustering technique is employed to identify the hamming weights of the CIM weights. Subsequently, we correlate traces belonging to known weights with traces belonging to Hamming groups with unknown weights in order to identify their weight values. As a case study, the attack was applied on SRAM CIM implementation based on 40nm TSMC technology. The results indicate that the weights stored in the CIM crossbar can be retrieved with 100% accuracy purely by analyzing the power consumption.

Binary Neural Networks (BNNs) have demonstrated significant advantages in reducing computation and memory costs, all while maintaining acceptable accuracy on various image detection tasks. Thus, BNNs have the potential to support practical cognitive tasks on resource-constrained platforms, such as edge computing devices. To realize this, SRAM-based digital Computation-in-Memory (CIM) has gained growing attention as it overcomes the analog CIM architecture bottlenecks such as limited computing accuracy due to process variation, non-linearity, power and area-hungry Analog-to-Digital Converters (ADCs), etc. However, digital CIM architectures are highly dominated by power-hungry adder-trees, which can nullify the benefits of SRAM-based digital CIM. To address this issue, this paper proposes an adder free SRAM-based digital CIM, AFSRAM-CIM, for BNN acceleration. The proposed CIM architecture utilizes a multi-functional 10-T SRAM cell-based crossbar array and a new energy-efficient approach to perform the popcount operation. Simulation results using the MNIST dataset show that the proposed architecture maintains the state-of-the-art inference accuracy of 99.21% with only 11.86 fJ energy per operation. Moreover, AFSRAM-CIM achieves over$3\times$energy and$\approx 17\times$area savings when compared to the conventional digital CIM approaches.

Wet Age related macular degeneration (AMD) is a type of age related macular degeneration. In order to detect Wet AMD we look for Pigment Epithelium detachment (PED) and fluid filled region caused by choroidal neovascularization (CNV). This form of AMD can cause vision loss if not treated in time. In this article we have proposed an automated system for detection of Wet AMD in Optical coherence tomographic (OCT) images. The proposed system extracts PED and CNV from OCT images using segmentation and morphological operations and then detailed feature set are extracted. These features are then passed on to the classifier for classification. Finally performance measures like accuracy, sensitivity and specificity are calculated and the classifier delivering the maximum performance is selected as a comparison measure. Our system gives higher performance using SVM as compared to other methods.