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Adrian Górecki

dblp:324/0471 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Theoretical computer science
1 paper
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design · 100%

Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice › computational social choice › voting rules
approval voting
0.612022
Proportional Public Decisions · AAAI 2022
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design › social choice
proportional representation
0.612022
Proportional Public Decisions · AAAI 2022
Algorithmic game theory and mechanism design
social choice
0.612022
Proportional Public Decisions · AAAI 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

axiomatic analysis · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 Proportional Public Decisions
abstract
We consider a setting where a group of individuals needs to make a number of independent decisions. The decisions should proportionally represent the views of the voters. We formulate new criteria of proportionality and analyse two rules, Proportional Approval Voting and the Method of Equal Shares, that are inspired by the corresponding approval-based committee election rules. We prove that the two rules provide very strong proportionality guarantees when applied to the setting of public decisions.
Piotr Skowron 0001, Adrian Górecki
AAAI2