VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Catherine Yu
dblp:324/3161
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2ranked-venue papers
0as first author
2since 2021 · last 2024
—ORCID · conflict
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 2 · 2 since 2021Theory of computation · 2 · 2 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2024 | Computing Optimal Manipulations in Cryptographic Self-Selection Proof-of-Stake ProtocolsabstractCryptographic Self-Selection is a paradigm employed by modern Proof-of-Stake consensus protocols to select a block-proposing "leader." Algorand [Chen and Micali, 2019] proposes a canonical protocol, and Ferreira et al. [2022] establish bounds f(α, β) on the maximum fraction of rounds a strategic player can lead as a function of their stake α and a network connectivity parameter β. While both their lower and upper bounds are non-trivial, there is a substantial gap between them (for example, they establish f(10%, 1) ∈ [10.08%, 21.12%]), leaving open the question of how significant of a concern these manipulations are. We develop computational methods to provably nail f(α, β) for any desired (α, β) up to arbitrary precision, and implement our method on a wide range of parameters (for example, we confirm f(10%, 1) ∈ [10.08%, 10.15%]). Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Aadityan Ganesh, Jack Hourigan, Hannah Huh, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu |
EC | 6 |
| 2022 | Optimal Strategic Mining Against Cryptographic Self-Selection in Proof-of-StakeabstractCryptographic Self-Selection is a subroutine used to select a leader for modern proof-of-stake consensus protocols. In cryptographic self-selection, each round r has a seed Qr. In round r, each account owner is asked to digitally sign Qr, hash their digital signature to produce a credential, and then broadcast this credential to the entire network. A publicly-known function scores each credential in a manner so that the distribution of the lowest scoring credential is identical to the distribution of stake owned by each account. The user who broadcasts the lowest-scoring credential is the leader for round r, and their credential becomes the seed Qr+1. Such protocols leave open the possibility of manipulation: a user who owns multiple accounts that each produce low-scoring credentials in round r can selectively choose which ones to broadcast in order to influence the seed for round r+1. Indeed, the user can pre-compute their credentials for round r+1 for each potential seed, and broadcast only the credential (among those with low enough score to be leader) that produces the most favorable seed. Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Ye Lin Sally Hahn, S. Matthew Weinberg, Catherine Yu |
EC | 4 |