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Letu Ren

dblp:325/0900 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Systems and software security · 100%
Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
1 paper
Operating systems · 100%

Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › vulnerability discovery › fuzzing
kernel driver fuzzing
0.612022
PrIntFuzz: fuzzing Linux drivers via automated virtual device simulation · ISSTA 2022
Systems and software security
vulnerability discovery
0.612022
PrIntFuzz: fuzzing Linux drivers via automated virtual device simulation · ISSTA 2022
Operating systems › i/o › i/o subsystem
device drivers
0.212022
PrIntFuzz: fuzzing Linux drivers via automated virtual device simulation · ISSTA 2022
Operating systems › i/o › i/o subsystem › device drivers
linux device drivers
0.212022
PrIntFuzz: fuzzing Linux drivers via automated virtual device simulation · ISSTA 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

static analysis · 1.1fuzzing · 1.1device emulation · 1.1
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 PrIntFuzz: fuzzing Linux drivers via automated virtual device simulation
abstract
Linux drivers share the same address space and privilege with the core of the kernel but have a much larger code base and attack surface. The Linux drivers are not well tested and have weaker security guarantees than the kernel. Missing support from hardware devices, existing fuzzing solutions fail to cover a large portion of the driver code, e.g., the initialization code and interrupt handlers. In this paper, we present PrIntFuzz, an efficient and universal fuzzing framework that can test the overlooked driver code, including the PRobing code and INTerrupt handlers. PrIntFuzz first extracts knowledge from the driver through inter-procedural field-sensitive, path-sensitive, and flow-sensitive static analysis. Then it utilizes the information to build a flexible and efficient simulator, which supports device probing, hardware interrupts emulation and device I/O interception. Lastly, PrIntFuzz applies a multi-dimension fuzzing strategy to explore the overlooked code. We have developed a prototype of PrIntFuzz and successfully simulated 311 virtual PCI (Peripheral Component Interconnect) devices, 472 virtual I2C (Inter-Integrated Circuit) devices, 169 virtual USB (Universal Serial Bus) devices, and found 150 bugs in the corresponding device drivers. We have submitted patches for these bugs to the Linux kernel community, and 59 patches have been merged so far. In a control experiment of Linux 5.10-rc6, PrIntFuzz found 99 bugs, while the state-of-the-art fuzzer only found 50. PrIntFuzz covers 11,968 basic blocks on the latest Linux kernel, while the state-of-the-art fuzzer Syzkaller only covers 2,353 basic blocks.
Zheyu Ma, Bodong Zhao, Letu Ren, Zheming Li, Siqi Ma 0001, Xiapu Luo, Chao Zhang 0008
ISSTA3