Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has gained prominence as an effective approach for control systems. However, its practical deployment is impeded by state perturbations that can severely impact system performance. Addressing this critical challenge requires robustness verification about system performance, which involves tackling two quantitative questions: (i) how to establish guaranteed bounds for expected cumulative rewards, and (ii) how to determine tail bounds for cumulative rewards. In this work, we present the first approach for robustness verification of DRL-based control systems by introducing reward martingales, which offer a rigorous mathematical foundation to characterize the impact of state perturbations on system performance in terms of cumulative rewards. Our verified results provide provably quantitative certificates for the two questions. We then show that reward martingales can be implemented and trained via neural networks, against different types of control policies. Experimental results demonstrate that our certified bounds tightly enclose simulation outcomes on various DRL-based control systems, indicating the effectiveness and generality of the proposed approach.

Abstract The rapid advance of deep reinforcement learning techniques enables the oversight of safety-critical systems through the utilization of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). This underscores the pressing need to promptly establish certified safety guarantees for such DNN-controlled systems. Most of the existing verification approaches rely on qualitative approaches, predominantly employing reachability analysis. However, qualitative verification proves inadequate for DNN-controlled systems as their behaviors exhibit stochastic tendencies when operating in open and adversarial environments. In this paper, we propose a novel framework for unifying both qualitative and quantitative safety verification problems of DNN-controlled systems. This is achieved by formulating the verification tasks as the synthesis of valid neural barrier certificates (NBCs). Initially, the framework seeks to establish almost-sure safety guarantees through qualitative verification. In cases where qualitative verification fails, our quantitative verification method is invoked, yielding precise lower and upper bounds on probabilistic safety across both infinite and finite time horizons. To facilitate the synthesis of NBCs, we introduce theirk-inductive variants. We also devise a simulation-guided approach for training NBCs, aiming to achieve tightness in computing precise certified lower and upper bounds. We prototype our approach into a tool called and showcase its efficacy on four classic DNN-controlled systems.

Formally verifying deep reinforcement learning (DRL) systems suffers from both inaccurate verification results and limited scalability. The major obstacle lies in the large overestimation introduced inherently during training and then transforming the inexplicable decision-making models, i.e., deep neural networks (DNNs), into easy-to-verify models. In this paper, we propose an inverse transform-then-train approach, which first encodes a DNN into an equivalent set of efficiently and tightly verifiable linear control policies and then optimizes them via reinforcement learning. We accompany our inverse approach with a novel neural network model called piece-wise linear decision neural networks (PLDNNs), which are compatible with most existing DRL training algorithms with comparable performance against conventional DNNs. Our extensive experiments show that, compared to DNN-based DRL systems, PLDNN-based systems can be more efficiently and tightly verified with up to $438$ times speedup and a significant reduction in overestimation. In particular, even a complex $12$-dimensional DRL system is efficiently verified with up to 7 times deeper computation steps.

Abstract Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) has demonstrated its strength in developing intelligent systems. These systems shall be formally guaranteed to be trustworthy when applied to safety-critical domains, which is typically achieved by formal verification performed after training. This train-then-verify process has two limits: (i) trained systems are difficult to formally verify due to their continuous and infinite state space and inexplicable AI components (i.e., deep neural networks), and (ii) the ex post facto detection of bugs increases both the time- and money-wise cost of training and deployment. In this paper, we propose a novel verification-in-the-loop training framework called Trainify for developing safe DRL systems driven by counterexample-guided abstraction and refinement. Specifically, Trainify trains a DRL system on a finite set of coarsely abstracted but efficiently verifiable state spaces. When verification fails, we refine the abstraction based on returned counterexamples and train again on the finer abstract states. The process is iterated until all predefined properties are verified against the trained system. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our framework on six classic control systems. The experimental results show that our framework yields more reliable DRL systems with provable guarantees without sacrificing system performance such as cumulative reward and robustness than conventional DRL approaches.