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Kunbei Cai

dblp:326/4249 · DBLP profile ↗
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3ranked-venue papers
2as first author
3since 2021 · last 2024
0009-0000-3895-6655ORCID · corroborated

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 2 · 1 first-author · 2 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
3 papers
Hardware security and side channels · 60% Security and privacy of machine learning · 40%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers
Hardware reliability and fault tolerance · 33% GPUs and heterogeneous computing · 33% Memory systems · 33%
Artificial intelligence
1 paper
Transfer learning and domain adaptation · 100%

Topics — the 7 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack
backdoor attack
1.522024
DeepVenom: Persistent DNN Backdoors Exploiting Transient Weight Perturbations in Memories · SP 2024
WBP: Training-Time Backdoor Attacks Through Hardware-Based Weight Bit Poisoning · ECCV (65) 2024
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks
cache attacks
0.812024
Invalidate+Compare: A Timer-Free GPU Cache Attack Primitive · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
Hardware security and side channels
fault attacks
0.812024
DeepVenom: Persistent DNN Backdoors Exploiting Transient Weight Perturbations in Memories · SP 2024
Hardware security and side channels › fault attacks › fault injection attack
rowhammer attack
0.812024
DeepVenom: Persistent DNN Backdoors Exploiting Transient Weight Perturbations in Memories · SP 2024
Machine learning › Transfer learning and domain adaptation
fine-tuning
0.212024
DeepVenom: Persistent DNN Backdoors Exploiting Transient Weight Perturbations in Memories · SP 2024
Memory systems
cache
0.212024
Invalidate+Compare: A Timer-Free GPU Cache Attack Primitive · USENIX Security Symposium 2024
GPUs and heterogeneous computing
GPU architecture
0.212024
Invalidate+Compare: A Timer-Free GPU Cache Attack Primitive · USENIX Security Symposium 2024

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

iterative backdoor boosting · 1.5invalidate+compare · 1.5hardware-based weight bit poisoning · 1.5ensemble-based bit search · 1.5
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2024 WBP: Training-Time Backdoor Attacks Through Hardware-Based Weight Bit Poisoning
Kunbei Cai, Zhenkai Zhang 0002, Qian Lou, Fan Yao 0001
ECCV (65)1
2024 DeepVenom: Persistent DNN Backdoors Exploiting Transient Weight Perturbations in Memories
abstract
Backdoor attacks have raised significant concerns in machine learning (ML) systems. Mainstream ML backdoor attacks typically involve either poisoning the victim’s training samples or pre-training poisoned models for use by victim users. Meanwhile, recent advances in hardware-based threats reveal that ML model integrity at inference-time can be seriously tampered by inducing transient faults in model weights. However, the adversarial impacts of such hardware fault attacks at training time have not been well understood.In this paper, we present DeepVenom, the first end-to-end hardware-based DNN backdoor attack during victim model training. Particularly, DeepVenom can insert a targeted backdoor persistently at the victim model fine-tuning runtime through transient faults in model weight memory (via rowhammer). DeepVenom manifests in two main steps: i) an offline step that identifies weight perturbation transferable to the victim model using an ensemble-based local model bit search algorithm, and ii) an online stage that integrates advanced system-level techniques to efficiently massage weight tensors for precise rowhammer-based bit flips. DeepVenom further employs a novel iterative backdoor boosting mechanism that performs multiple rounds of weight perturbations to stabilize the backdoor. We implement an end-to-end DeepVenom attack in real systems with DDR3/DDR4 memories, and evaluate it using state-of-the-art Convolutional Neural Network and Vision Transformer models. The results show that DeepVenom can effectively generate backdoors in victim’s fine-tuned models with upto 99.8% attack success rate (97.8% on average) using as few as 11 total weight bit flips (maximum 49). The evaluation further demonstrates that DeepVenom is successful under varying victim fine-tuning hyperparameter settings, and is highly robust against catastrophic forgetting. Our work highlights the practicality of training-time backdoors through hardware-based weight perturbation, which represents a new dimension in adversarial machine learning.
Kunbei Cai, Md Hafizul Islam Chowdhuryy, Zhenkai Zhang 0002, Fan Yao 0001
SP1
2024 Invalidate+Compare: A Timer-Free GPU Cache Attack Primitive
Zhenkai Zhang 0002, Kunbei Cai, Yanan Guo 0002, Fan Yao 0001, Xing Gao 0001
USENIX Security Symposium2