As the complexity of AI systems and their interactions with the world increases, generating explanations for their behaviour is important for safely deploying AI. For agents, the most natural abstractions for predicting behaviour attribute beliefs, intentions and goals to the system. If an agent behaves as if it has a certain goal or belief, then we can make reasonable predictions about how it will behave in novel situations, including those where comprehensive safety evaluations are untenable. How well can we infer an agent’s beliefs from their behaviour, and how reliably can these inferred beliefs predict the agent’s behaviour in novel situations? We provide a precise answer to this question under the assumption that the agent’s behaviour is guided by a world model. Our contribution is the derivation of novel bounds on the agent's behaviour in new (unseen) deployment environments, which represent a theoretical limit for predicting intentional agents from behavioural data alone. We discuss the implications of these results for several research areas including fairness and safety.

Are world models a necessary ingredient for flexible, goal-directed behaviour, or is model-free learning sufficient? We provide a formal answer to this question, showing that any agent capable of generalizing to multi-step goal-directed tasks must have learned a predictive model of its environment. We show that this model can be extracted from the agent's policy, and that increasing the agents performance or the complexity of the goals it can achieve requires learning increasingly accurate world models. This has a number of consequences: from developing safe and general agents, to bounding agent capabilities in complex environments, and providing new algorithms for eliciting world models from agents.

Agents are minimally entities that are influenced by their past observations and act to influence future observations. This latter capacity is captured by empowerment, which has served as a vital framing concept across artificial intelligence and cognitive science. This former capacity, however, is equally foundational: In what ways, and to what extent, can an agent be influenced by what it observes? In this paper, we ground this concept in a universal agent-centric measure that we refer to as plasticity, and reveal a fundamental connection to empowerment. Following a set of desiderata on a suitable definition, we define plasticity using a new information-theoretic quantity we call the generalized directed information. We show that this new quantity strictly generalizes the directed information introduced by Massey (1990) while preserving all of its desirable properties. Under this definition, we find that plasticity is well thought of as the mirror of empowerment: The two concepts are defined using the same measure, with only the direction of influence reversed. Our main result establishes a tension between the plasticity and empowerment of an agent, suggesting that agent design needs to be mindful of both characteristics. We explore the implications of these findings, and suggest that plasticity, empowerment, and their relationship are essential to understanding agency.

Causal models of agents have been used to analyse the safety aspects of machine learning systems. But identifying agents is non-trivial – often the causal model is just assumed by the modeller without much justification – and modelling failures can lead to mistakes in the safety analysis. This paper proposes the first formal causal definition of agents – roughly that agents are systems that would adapt their policy if their actions influenced the world in a different way. From this we derive the first causal discovery algorithm for discovering the presence of agents from empirical data, given a set of variables and under certain assumptions. We also provide algorithms for translating between causal models and game-theoretic influence diagrams. We demonstrate our approach by resolving some previous confusions caused by incorrect causal modelling of agents.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound for a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

Causal models of agents have been used to analyse the safety aspects of machine learning systems. But identifying agents is non-trivial – often the causal model is just assumed by the modeller without much justification – and modelling failures can lead to mistakes in the safety analysis. This paper proposes the first formal causal definition of agents – roughly that agents are systems that would adapt their policy if their actions influenced the world in a different way. From this we derive the first causal discovery algorithm for discovering the presence of agents from empirical data, given a set of variables and under certain assumptions. We also provide algorithms for translating between causal models and game-theoretic influence diagrams. We demonstrate our approach by resolving some previous confusions caused by incorrect causal modelling of agents.