Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Xaver Fabian
dblp:329/3823
· DBLP profile ↗
2ranked-venue papers
2as first author
2since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-6342-4646ORCID · corroborated
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021Software engineering, systems software and programming languages · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
2 papers |
Hardware security and side channels · 100% | |
| Software engineering, system software, and programming languages
2 papers |
Compilers and program optimization · 84% Program analysis · 16% | |
| Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
2 papers |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100% |
Topics — the 5 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Hardware security and side channels
side channel |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks › transient execution attack › speculative execution attack
spectre |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025 |
Hardware security and side channels › microarchitectural attacks › transient execution attack
speculative execution attack |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025 |
Compilers and program optimization
secure compilation |
0.9 | 1 | 2025 | Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre Attacks · Proc. ACM Program. Lang. 2025 |
Processor architecture and microarchitecture
speculative execution |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Automatic Detection of Speculative Execution Combinations · CCS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
speculative semantics lifting · 2.6secure compilation proof · 2.6static analysis · 1.7formal modeling · 1.7
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Do You Even Lift? Strengthening Compiler Security Guarantees against Spectre AttacksabstractMainstream compilers implement different countermeasures to prevent specific classes of speculative execution attacks. Unfortunately, these countermeasures either lack formal guarantees or come with proofs restricted to speculative semantics capturing only a subset of the speculation mechanisms supported by modern CPUs, thereby limiting their practical applicability. Ideally, these security proofs should target a speculative semantics capturing the effects of all speculation mechanisms implemented in modern CPUs. However, this is impractical and requires new secure compilation proofs to support additional speculation mechanisms. In this paper, we address this problem by proposing a novel secure compilation framework that allows lifting the security guarantees provided by Spectre countermeasures from weaker speculative semantics (ignoring some speculation mechanisms) to stronger ones (accounting for the omitted mechanisms) without requiring new secure compilation proofs. Using our lifting framework, we performed the most comprehensive security analysis of Spectre countermeasures implemented in mainstream compilers to date. Our analysis spans 9 different countermeasures against 5 classes of Spectre attacks, which we proved secure against a speculative semantics accounting for 5 different speculation mechanisms. Our analysis highlights that fence-based and retpoline-based countermeasures can be securely lifted to the strongest speculative semantics under study. In contrast, countermeasures based on speculative load hardening cannot be securely lifted to semantics supporting indirect jump speculation. Xaver Fabian, Marco Patrignani, Marco Guarnieri, Michael Backes 0001 |
Proc. ACM Program. Lang. | 1 |
| 2022 | Automatic Detection of Speculative Execution CombinationsabstractModern processors employ different speculation mechanisms to speculate over different kinds of instructions. Attackers can exploit these mechanisms simultaneously in order to trigger leaks of speculatively-accessed data. Thus, sound reasoning about such speculative leaks requires accounting for all potential speculation mechanisms. Unfortunately, existing formal models only support reasoning about fixed, hard-coded speculation mechanisms, with no simple support to extend said reasoning to new mechanisms. Xaver Fabian, Marco Guarnieri, Marco Patrignani |
CCS | 1 |