Ruoyu Song 0001

dblp:329/6551-1 · DBLP profile ↗
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5ranked-venue papers
1as first author
5since 2021 · last 2026
0009-0008-8807-048XORCID · verified

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Security and privacy · 4 · 1 first-author · 4 since 2021Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 1 · 1 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 since 2021
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2026 CP-FREEZER: Latency Attacks Against Vehicular Cooperative Perception
abstract
Cooperative perception (CP) enhances situational awareness of connected and autonomous vehicles by exchanging and combining messages from multiple agents. While prior work has explored adversarial integrity attacks that degrade detection accuracy, little is known about CP's robustness against attacks on timeliness (or availability), a safety-critical requirement for autonomous driving. In this paper, we present CP-FREEZER, the first latency attack that maximizes the computation delay of CP algorithms by injecting adversarial perturbation via V2V messages. Our attack resolves several unique challenges, including the non-differentiability of point cloud preprocessing, asynchronous knowledge of the victim’s input due to transmission delays, and uses a novel loss function that effectively maximizes the execution time of the CP pipeline. Extensive experiments show that CP-FREEZER increases end-to-end CP latency by over 90×, pushing per-frame processing time beyond 3 seconds with a 100% success rate on our real-world vehicle testbed. Our findings reveal a critical threat to the availability of CP systems, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses.
Chenyi Wang 0005, Ruoyu Song 0001, Raymond Muller, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Z. Berkay Celik, Jonathan Petit, Ryan M. Gerdes, Ming Li 0003
AAAI2
2025 Investigating Physical Latency Attacks Against Camera-Based Perception
abstract
Camera-based perception is a central component to the visual perception of autonomous systems. Recent works have investigated latency attacks against perception pipelines, which can lead to a Denial-of-Service against the autonomous system. Unfortunately, these attacks lack real-world applicability, either relying on digital perturbations or requiring large, unscalable, and highly visible patches that cover up the victim's view. In this paper, we propose Detstorm, a novel physically realizable latency attack against camera-based perception. Detstorm uses projector perturbations to cause delays in perception by creating a large number of adversarial objects. These objects are optimized on four objectives to evade filtering by multiple Non-Maximum Suppression (NMS) approaches. To maximize the number of created objects in a dynamic physical environment, Detstorm takes a unique greedy approach, segmenting the environment into “zones” containing distinct object classes and maximizing the number of created objects per zone. Detstorm adapts to changes in the environment in real time, recombining perturbation patterns via our zone stitching process into a contiguous, physically projectable image. Evaluations in both simulated and real-world experiments show that Detstorm causes a 506% increase in detected objects on average, delaying perception results by up to 8.1 seconds, and capable of causing physical consequences on real-world autonomous driving systems.
Raymond Muller, Ruoyu Song 0001, Chenyi Wang 0005, Yuxia Zhan, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Yanmao Man, Ming Li 0003, Ryan M. Gerdes, Jonathan Petit, Z. Berkay Celik
SP2
2025 From Threat to Trust: Exploiting Attention Mechanisms for Attacks and Defenses in Cooperative Perception
Chenyi Wang 0005, Raymond Muller, Ruoyu Song 0001, Jean-Philippe Monteuuis, Jonathan Petit, Yanmao Man, Ryan M. Gerdes, Z. Berkay Celik, Ming Li 0003
USENIX Security Symposium3
2023 Evasion Attacks and Defenses on Smart Home Physical Event Verification
Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Ruoyu Song 0001, Habiba Farrukh, Z. Berkay Celik
NDSS2
2023 Discovering Adversarial Driving Maneuvers against Autonomous Vehicles
Ruoyu Song 0001, Muslum Ozgur Ozmen, Hyungsub Kim, Raymond Muller, Z. Berkay Celik, Antonio Bianchi
USENIX Security Symposium1