Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Yuanhao Ban
dblp:331/0035
· DBLP profile ↗
3ranked-venue papers
3as first author
3since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-2114-9340ORCID · reported
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Artificial intelligence and machine learning · 3 · 3 first-author · 3 since 2021Graphics, computer vision, multimedia, augmented reality and games · 1 · 1 first-author · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Artificial intelligence
3 papers |
Generative modeling · 76% Image recognition and object detection · 20% Representation and self-supervised learning · 4% | |
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Security and privacy of machine learning · 100% |
Topics — the 6 heaviest of 8, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Machine learning › Generative modeling
diffusion model |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | The Crystal Ball Hypothesis in diffusion models: Anticipating object positions from initial noise · ICLR 2025 Understanding the Impact of Negative Prompts: When and How Do They Take Effect? · ECCV (89) 2024 |
Machine learning › Generative modeling › diffusion model
text-to-image generation |
1.6 | 2 | 2025 | The Crystal Ball Hypothesis in diffusion models: Anticipating object positions from initial noise · ICLR 2025 Understanding the Impact of Negative Prompts: When and How Do They Take Effect? · ECCV (89) 2024 |
Security and privacy of machine learning
adversarial example |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Pre-trained Adversarial Perturbations · NeurIPS 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › transferable adversarial attack
transferable adversarial perturbation |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Pre-trained Adversarial Perturbations · NeurIPS 2022 |
Security and privacy of machine learning › adversarial attack › adversarial perturbation
universal adversarial perturbation |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Pre-trained Adversarial Perturbations · NeurIPS 2022 |
Machine learning › Representation and self-supervised learning › representation learning › unsupervised representation learning
self-supervised representation learning |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | Pre-trained Adversarial Perturbations · NeurIPS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
noise augmentation · 1.1adversarial perturbation · 1.1two-sample test · 0.9reject sampling · 0.9diffusion model · 0.9
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | The Crystal Ball Hypothesis in diffusion models: Anticipating object positions from initial noiseabstractDiffusion models have achieved remarkable success in text-to-image generation tasks, yet the influence of initial noise remains largely unexplored. In this study, we identify specific regions within the initial noise image, termed trigger patches, that play a key role in inducing object generation in the resulting images. Notably, these patches are **universal** and can be generalized across various positions, seeds, and prompts. To be specific, extracting these patches from one noise and injecting them into another noise leads to object generation in targeted areas. To identify the trigger patches even before the image has been generated, just like consulting the crystal ball to foresee fate, we first create a dataset consisting of Gaussian noises labeled with bounding boxes corresponding to the objects appearing in the generated images and **train a detector that identifies these patches from the initial noise.** To explain the formation of these patches, we reveal that they are **outliers** in Gaussian noise, and follow distinct distributions through two-sample tests. These outliers can take effect when injected into different noises and generalize well across different settings. Finally, we find the misalignment between prompts and the trigger patch patterns can result in unsuccessful image generations. To overcome it, we propose a reject-sampling strategy to obtain optimal noise, aiming to improve prompt adherence and positional diversity in image generation. Yuanhao Ban, Tianyi Zhou 0001, Boqing Gong, Cho-Jui Hsieh, Minhao Cheng |
ICLR | 1 |
| 2024 | Understanding the Impact of Negative Prompts: When and How Do They Take Effect?
Yuanhao Ban, Tianyi Zhou 0001, Minhao Cheng, Boqing Gong, Cho-Jui Hsieh |
ECCV (89) | 1 |
| 2022 | Pre-trained Adversarial PerturbationsabstractSelf-supervised pre-training has drawn increasing attention in recent years due to its superior performance on numerous downstream tasks after fine-tuning. However, it is well-known that deep learning models lack the robustness to adversarial examples, which can also invoke security issues to pre-trained models, despite being less explored. In this paper, we delve into the robustness of pre-trained models by introducing Pre-trained Adversarial Perturbations (PAPs), which are universal perturbations crafted for the pre-trained models to maintain the effectiveness when attacking fine-tuned ones without any knowledge of the downstream tasks. To this end, we propose a Low-Level Layer Lifting Attack (L4A) method to generate effective PAPs by lifting the neuron activations of low-level layers of the pre-trained models. Equipped with an enhanced noise augmentation strategy, L4A is effective at generating more transferable PAPs against the fine-tuned models. Extensive experiments on typical pre-trained vision models and ten downstream tasks demonstrate that our method improves the attack success rate by a large margin compared to the state-of-the-art methods. Yuanhao Ban, Yinpeng Dong |
NeurIPS | 1 |