Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Arnab Chattopadhyay
dblp:331/5922
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Computer networks · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Network security · 100% | |
| Computer networks
1 paper |
Network measurement and analytics · 50% Internet architecture and protocols · 50% |
Topics — the 3 heaviest of 3, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Network security › attack strategy › denial-of-service attack
DDoS attack |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Investigating the impact of DDoS attacks on DNS infrastructure · IMC 2022 |
Network measurement and analytics › internet measurement
DNS measurement |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | Investigating the impact of DDoS attacks on DNS infrastructure · IMC 2022 |
Internet architecture and protocols › domain name system
DNS robustness |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | Investigating the impact of DDoS attacks on DNS infrastructure · IMC 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
darknet data analysis · 1.1DNS measurement data joining · 1.1
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Investigating the impact of DDoS attacks on DNS infrastructureabstractDenial of Service (DDoS) attacks both abuse and target core Internet infrastructures and services, including the Domain Name System (DNS). To characterize recent DDoS attacks against authoritative DNS infrastructure, we join two existing data sets - DoS activity inferred from a sizable darknet, and contemporaneous DNS measurement data - for a 17-month period (Nov. 20 - Mar. 22). Our measurements reveal evidence that millions of domains (up to 5% of the DNS namespace) experienced a DoS attack during our observation window. Most attacks did not substantially harm DNS performance, but in some cases we saw 100-fold increases in DNS resolution time, or complete unreachability. Our measurements captured a devastating attack against a large provider in the Netherlands (TransIP), and attacks against Russian infrastructure. Our data corroborates the value of known best practices to improve DNS resilience to attacks, including the use of anycast and topological redundancy in nameserver infrastructure. We discuss the strengths and weaknesses of our data sets for DDoS tracking and impact on the DNS, and promising next steps to improve our understanding of the evolving DDoS ecosystem. Raffaele Sommese, K. C. Claffy, Roland van Rijswijk-Deij, Arnab Chattopadhyay, Alberto Dainotti, Anna Sperotto, Mattijs Jonker |
IMC | 4 |