VLDB 2026 Research / reviewers in the wild / expert
Lisa Geierhaas
dblp:331/6898
· DBLP profile ↗
5ranked-venue papers
2as first author
5since 2021 · last 2025
0009-0006-5844-559XORCID · verified
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 3 · 2 first-author · 3 since 2021Human-computer interaction and ubiquitous computing · 3 · 3 since 2021
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2025 | Out of Sight, Out of Mind? Exploring Data Protection Practices for Personal Data in Usable Security & Privacy StudiesabstractAdherence to data protection measures such as pseudonymization or anonymization is critical in human subjects research because it has a direct impact on the confidentiality of participants' sensitive information, trust in research practices, and compliance with ethical and legal standards. Regulations such as the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) and guarantees made by researchers in informed consent forms mandate strict protocols for data security. However, compliance with these is not always straightforward. To gain qualitative insights into data protection practices in the field of Usable Security and Privacy (USP), we conducted interviews with 22 practitioners (five professors, eight researchers, nine data protection officers) and one focus group with five researchers. Overall, our results show a high awareness of ethical and legal responsibilities but highlight many practical and procedural issues. Based on these, we make concrete recommendations on how to improve the protection of personal data in research. Florin Martius, Luisa Jansen, Lukas Struck, Arthi Arumugam, Lisa Geierhaas, Anna-Marie Ortloff, Matthew Smith 0001, Christian Tiefenau |
CHI | 5 |
| 2025 | Small, Medium, Large? A Meta-Study of Effect Sizes at CHI to Aid Interpretation of Effect Sizes and Power CalculationabstractStatistical reporting, especially of effect sizes, is at the root of many methodological issues in quantitative research at CHI. Effect sizes are necessary for assessing practical relevance of results, a-priori power analysis, and meta-analyses, but currently, they are often not reported. Interpretations in the context of the study and the research field are also rare. To aid to researchers in reporting and contextualizing their effect sizes within their research field as well as choosing effect sizes for power analysis, we conducted a meta-study of quantitative CHI papers. We extracted statistics from all quantitative CHI papers published between 2019-2023 (N=1692). Based on effect sizes and the papers' CCS categories, we present effect size distributions in 12 CHI research fields. Through an additional qualitative analysis of 67 quantitative CHI'23 publications, we identify five categories of approaches that researchers take when interpreting effect size: Comparing test-specific values, assigning size labels, using a statistical or methodological reference frame, comparing different observations and interpreting for the big picture. Anna-Marie Ortloff, Florin Martius, Mischa Meier, Theo Sans-Raimbault, Lisa Geierhaas, Matthew Smith 0001 |
CHI | 5 |
| 2025 | Replication: "No one can hack my mind" - 10 years later: An update and outlook on experts' and non-experts' security practices and advice
Anna-Marie Ortloff, Jenny Tang, Arthi Arumugam, Daniel Huschina, Lisa Geierhaas, Florin Martius, Luisa Jansen, Kolja von der Twer, Lilly Jungbluth, Matthew Smith 0001 |
SOUPS | 5 |
| 2025 | "Not the Right Question?" A Study on Attitudes Toward Client-Side Scanning with Security and Privacy Researchers and a U.S. Population SampleabstractFor decades, law enforcement and privacy advocates have struggled to find common ground regarding surveillance and privacy, resulting in the so-called Crypto Wars. When Apple announced it was planning to implement client-side scanning (CSS) in 2021 as a privacy-preserving compromise to detect known child sexual abuse material (CSAM), it received such intense pushback, especially from IT experts, that it dropped the plans within weeks. However, a study of the European population by ECPAT [1] and another of the German population by Geierhaas et al. [2] showed that despite concerns, the majority stated that they supported CSS for the detection of CSAM. This highlights a potential mismatch between “the majority” and “the experts.” To examine the different attitudes toward CSS further, we extend the work by Geierhaas in two ways. First, we conducted qualitative interviews with 19 IT security and privacy researchers at two major IT security conferences: the Symposium on Usable Privacy and Security (SOUPS) and the USENIX Security Symposium. In our second study, we replicated the German survey with a representative sample (age, gender, and state) from the USA. This was done both to examine possible cultural differences between Germany and the U.S. and to have a U.S. view to compare to our interview study. In this paper, we discuss key similarities and differences between the U.S. and German samples and contrast these with the researchers' views on the matter. Lisa Geierhaas, Florin Martius, Arthi Arumugam, Matthew Smith 0001 |
SP | 1 |
| 2023 | Attitudes towards Client-Side Scanning for CSAM, Terrorism, Drug Trafficking, Drug Use and Tax Evasion in GermanyabstractIn recent years, there have been a rising number of legislative efforts and proposed technical measures to weaken privacy-preserving technology, with the stated goal of countering serious crimes like child abuse. One of these proposed measures is Client-Side Scanning (CSS). CSS has been hotly debated both in the context of Apple stating their intention to deploy it in 2021 as well as EU legislation being proposed in 2022. Both sides of the argument state that they are working in the best interests of the people. To shed some light on this, we conducted a survey with a representative sample of German citizens. We investigated the general acceptance of CSS vs cloud-based scanning for different types of crimes and analyzed how trust in the German government and companies such as Google and Apple influenced our participants’ views. We found that, by and large, the majority of participants were willing to accept CSS measures to combat serious crimes such as child abuse or terrorism, but support dropped significantly for other illegal activities. However, the majority of participants who supported CSS were also worried about potential abuse, with only 20% stating that they were not concerned. These results suggest that many of our participants would be willing to have their devices scanned and accept some risks in the hope of aiding law enforcement. In our analysis, we argue that there are good reasons to not see this as a carte blanche for the introduction of CSS but as a call to action for the S&P community. More research is needed into how a population’s desire to prevent serious crime online can be achieved while mitigating the risks to privacy and society. Lisa Geierhaas, Fabian Otto, Maximilian Häring, Matthew Smith 0001 |
SP | 1 |