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Jeffrey Neal Collins

dblp:332/1636 · DBLP profile ↗
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1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none

Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several

Systems, architecture and hardware · 1 · 1 since 2021

Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.

Network and information security
1 paper
Hardware security and side channels · 44% Systems and software security · 44% Security and privacy of machine learning · 13%
Computer architecture, parallel and distributed computing, and storage systems
1 paper
Processor architecture and microarchitecture · 100%

Topics — the 2 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it

TopicWeightPapersLastEvidence papers
Systems and software security › runtime security
adaptive defense
0.612022
EVAX: Towards a Practical, Pro-active & Adaptive Architecture for High Performance & Security · MICRO 2022
Hardware security and side channels › side-channel countermeasures
microarchitectural attack defense
0.612022
EVAX: Towards a Practical, Pro-active & Adaptive Architecture for High Performance & Security · MICRO 2022

Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics

performance counters · 1.1generative framework · 1.1machine learning models · 0.6machine learning model · 0.6
YearPublicationVenuePosition
2022 EVAX: Towards a Practical, Pro-active & Adaptive Architecture for High Performance & Security
abstract
This paper provides an end-to-end solution to defend against known microarchitectural attacks such as speculative execution attacks, fault-injection attacks, covert and side channel attacks, and unknown or evasive versions of these attacks. Current defenses are attack specific and can have unacceptably high performance overhead. We propose an approach that reduces the overhead of state-of-art defenses by over 95%, by applying defenses only when attacks are detected. Many current proposed mitigations are not practical for deployment; for example, InvisiSpec has 27% overhead and Fencing has 74% overhead while protecting against only Spectre attacks. Other mitigations carry similar performance penalties. We reduce the overhead for InvisiSpec to 1.26% and for Fencing to 3.45% offering performance and security for not only spectre attacks but other known transient attacks as well, including the dangerous class of LVI and Rowhammer attacks, as well as covering a large set of future evasive and zero-day attacks. Critical to our approach is an accurate detector that is not fooled by evasive attacks and that can generalize to novel zero-day attacks. We use a novel Generative framework, Evasion Vaccination (EVAX) for training ML models and engineering new security-centric performance counters. EVAX significantly increases sensitivity to detect and classify attacks in time for mitigation to be deployed with low false positives (4 FPs in every 1M instructions in our experiments). Such performance enables efficient and timely mitigations, enabling the processor to automatically switch between performance and security as needed.
Samira Mirbagher Ajorpaz, Daniel Moghimi, Jeffrey Neal Collins, Gilles Pokam, Nael B. Abu-Ghazaleh, Dean M. Tullsen
MICRO3