Demo Data from VLDB 2026 / reviewers in the wild / expert
Noah Delius
dblp:332/2878
· DBLP profile ↗
1ranked-venue papers
0as first author
1since 2021 · last 2022
—ORCID · none
Domains — the database's venue-derived domains; a paper can count in several
Security and privacy · 1 · 1 since 2021
Expertise — from the expertise taxonomy: the topics of the expert's papers under the CCF categories. A weight counts papers with recency: 1 for a paper about the topic, 0.3 when the topic is its context, halved every five years.
| Network and information security
1 paper |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security · 61% Privacy and data protection · 39% |
Topics — the 4 heaviest of 4, each with the papers that count most for it
| Topic | Weight | Papers | Last | Evidence papers |
|---|---|---|---|---|
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › electronic cash
central bank digital currency |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Platypus: A Central Bank Digital Currency with Unlinkable Transactions and Privacy-Preserving Regulation · CCS 2022 |
Blockchain and cryptocurrency security › confidential transactions
privacy-preserving transaction |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Platypus: A Central Bank Digital Currency with Unlinkable Transactions and Privacy-Preserving Regulation · CCS 2022 |
Privacy and data protection › anonymity
transaction unlinkability |
0.6 | 1 | 2022 | Platypus: A Central Bank Digital Currency with Unlinkable Transactions and Privacy-Preserving Regulation · CCS 2022 |
Privacy and data protection › consumer privacy
financial privacy |
0.2 | 1 | 2022 | Platypus: A Central Bank Digital Currency with Unlinkable Transactions and Privacy-Preserving Regulation · CCS 2022 |
Methods — techniques the papers use, named apart from their topics
e-cash · 0.6anonymous cryptocurrency techniques · 0.6
| Year | Publication | Venue | Position |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2022 | Platypus: A Central Bank Digital Currency with Unlinkable Transactions and Privacy-Preserving RegulationabstractDue to the popularity of blockchain-based cryptocurrencies, the increasing digitalization of payments, and the constantly reducing role of cash in society, central banks have shown an increased interest in deploying central bank digital currencies (CBDCs) that could serve as a digital cash-equivalent. While most recent research on CBDCs focuses on blockchain technology, it is not clear that this choice of technology provides the optimal solution. In particular, the centralized trust model of a CBDC offers opportunities for different designs. In this paper, we depart from blockchain designs and instead build on ideas from traditional e-cash schemes. We propose a new style of building digital currencies that combines the transaction processing model of e-cash with an account-based fund management model. We argue that such a style of building digital currencies is especially well-suited to CBDCs. We also design the first such digital currency system, called Platypus, that provides strong privacy, high scalability, and expressive but simple regulation, which are all critical features for a CBDC. Platypus achieves these properties by adapting techniques similar to those used in anonymous blockchain cryptocurrencies like Zcash to fit our account model and applying them to the e-cash context. Karl Wüst, Kari Kostiainen, Noah Delius, Srdjan Capkun |
CCS | 3 |